Goldie: Historic Bays in International Law

HISTORIC BAYS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW-AN IMPRESSIONISTIC OVERVIEW
L.F.E. Goldie*
CONTENTS
I.

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212

II.

Three Conferences: Three Missed
Opportunities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214

III.

Basic Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220

IV.

Effectiveness, Acquiescence and
Sovereignty ..................................... 221

V.

The "Vital Interests" of the Coastal State. . . . . . . . . 226

VI.

Five United States Supreme Court Cases ..........
A. Background .................................
B. The Submerged Lands Act ...................
C. An Outline of the Five Submerged Lands Cases
Relating to Historic Bays and Historic Waters.
1. United States v. California·...... ..........
2. United States v. Louisiana (Louisiana Boundary Case) . ............................ ~ . .
3. United States v. Florida. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4. United States v. Maine. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5. United States v. Alaska. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
D. Reliance on the United States Case for the
Clarification and Evolution of Relevant Principles
of International Law- Persuasion, Reception and
Transformation ..............................
1. International Law in Domestic Tribunals ...
2. Domestic Law in International Tribunals ...

VII.

229
229
230
231
233
236
239
240
241

243
244
247

The Establishment of Rights. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248
A. Acts Necessary to Consolidate Historic Title ... 248
B. The Critical Date. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252

• Professor of Law, Director, International Legal Studies Program, Syracuse University College of Law.

211
Published by SURFACE, 1984

1

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 11, No. 2 [1984], Art. 3

Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com.

212

[Vol. 11:211

VIII.

Burden of Proof. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257
A. A View from the United Nations Secretariat. . . 257
B. The Supreme Court's Doctrine and International
Law ....... ; ................................ 258

IX.

The Rights of the Coastal State .................. 260

X.

Some Codification Proposals. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. A View from Africa. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Politics in the Third United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea ..........................
C. The Proposal of a Distinguished Scholar. . . . . . .
D. A Strategic Withdrawal?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
E. Codification on Historic Rights: The Impossible
Dream? .....................................

XI.

263
263
265
269
270
271

Some Questions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271

By "historic waters" are usually meant waters which are treated
as internal waters but which would not have that character were it
not for the existence of an historic title.
-The International Court of Justice 1

I. INTRODUCTION
Today a world-wide, irreversible enclosure movement is committed to annexing new sea areas into the territory of coastal states
or adding them to zones of exclusive state jurisdiction. But the
movement we can observe in the oceans' commons today is not only
a decentralized one whereby each state takes what may be permitted (or at least what would not appear to it to be effectively
prohibited), but also a second, "centralized" 2 enclosure movement
1. Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 l.C.J. 116, 130 (Judgment of Dec. 18).
2. For the descriptive terms "centralized" and "decentralized" enclosures of the
oceans, see Friedheim, The Political, Economic, and Legal Ocean, in MANAGING OCEAN
RESOURCES: A PRIMER 26 (Friedheim ed. 1979). He defines "centralized" enclosure as follows:
Ownership is transferred to the world system under the notion that the oceans
are the "common heritage of mankind,'' allowing a new comprehensive organiza·
tion for the management of ocean space, acting as agent for the world community,
to allocate the permitted uses of ocean space so as to avoid the boom-or-bust activity.
Id. at 36.
Friedheim defines decentralized enclosure or national enclosure, "a second best solution,'' as follows:
The right to allocate which the coastal States have assigned to themselves may
be used to redistribute wealth only and not create rational management schemes
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limiting high seas freedoms. Be the issues of the centralized
enclosure as they may ,3 this paper will take up the traditional concept of historic bays as one time-honored basis for asserting national
claims at the expense of the common high seas, which, however,
unlike some of the more recent forms of decentralized enclosures,
purports to rely on, or should rely on, a specific, objective and
clearly articulated definition, rather than on a Humpty-Dumpty
subjectivity- as reflected in the following well-known assertion:
Words mean what I choose them to mean ... Neither more nor
less ... The question is ... which is to master-that's all.'
This kind of capriciousness and uncontrolled subjectivity is,
for example, to be found in the concept, not recognized in international law, of "Closed Seas." This writer has written, regarding this
Soviet concept:
"Closed Seas." The Soviet Union is known as a state which has
continuously adhered to the Czarist claim of a territorial sea of
12 marine miles. Now, when the United States appears to be ready
to negotiate that claim, another category of exclusive claims has
arisen over seas which Soviet Russia has inherited from the Czars,
namely the so-called "closed seas." These would now appear to have
been left out of the U.S. calculations. It is very hard to pin down
any exact meaning of this concept, but it would appear to indicate
that the Soviet Union regards the following seas (and this list is
neither complete nor closed against the future additions) as internal waters: the White Sea, the Black Sea, the Kara Sea, the Sea
of Okhotsk, the Baltic Sea, the Sea of Japan. In these seas, according to the Soviet view, only littoral coasts may exercise freedom
of navigation. This claim is unrecognized by the Family of Nations,
and the Soviet Union is not pressing it- for the moment. The Arab
States have sought to adopt this Russian concept to the Gulf of
Aqaba. 5

In the belief that values of legality and the fulfillment of
justified expectations arise through the predictability of law, the
for the resources. It is a system dependent upon drawing borders, but borders
in the ocean world are still hard to define, draw, and defend .... Finally, national
enclosure does not handle the question of equity well ...
Id. 37-38.
3. Goldie, A Note on Some Diverse Meanings of the "Common Heritage of Mankind,"
10 SYR. J. INT'L L. & COM. 69 (1983).
4. L. CARROLL, Through the Looking Glass inc. DODGSON, THE ANNOTATED ALICE 269
(1960) (paraphrased).
5. Goldie, International Law of the Sea-A Review of States' Offshore Claims and Com-petences, 24 NAVAL WAR C. REV., 43, 51 (No. 6 Sequence No. 234, Feb. 1972).

Published by SURFACE, 1984

3

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 11, No. 2 [1984], Art. 3

Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com.

214

[Vol. 11 :211

paper which follows has been set to the two related tasks of proposing a definition of the traditional legal concept of historic bays
and of suggesting the advantages of establishing claims, and of
asserting counterclaims, in terms of this established criterion rather
than exposing the world's seafaring interests to the indeterminacy
and capriciousness of emerging, vague and subjectively-oriented
concepts.

II. THREE CONFERENCES:
THREE MISSED OPPORTUNITIES
The special legal status of historic bays was recognized in the
North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Arbitration of 1910.6 The Tribunal
stated that "conventions and established usage might be considered
as the basis for claiming as territorial those bays which on this
ground might be called historic bays ...." and that "such claims
should be held valid in the absence of any principle of international
law on the subject...." 7 The tribunal found that "the more impor~
tant bays such as Chaleurs, Conception, and Miramichi" 8 should be
so regarded. In the Fisheries Case9 the International Court of Justice
unequivocally recognized historic waters as an established category
of international law as the quotation under the title of this paper
testifies. The doctrine forming the topic of this paper is thus well
known to publicists and commentators and has been invoked in
diplomatic exchanges as a basis of states' claims to exercise a special
maritime jurisdiction. It has been attested to in decisions of domestic
courts of the highest reputation, in those of arbitral tribunals and
in at least one landmark judgment of the International Court of
Justice. It is thus something of a surprise, perhaps, that the twin
6. North Atlantic Coast Fisheries (U.S. v. Gr. Brit.) The Hague Arbitration Cases
134 (Wilson ed. 1915).
7. Id. at 184. Although the tribunal employed the adjective "territorial" to qualify

the waters of the relevant historic bays, it is clear from the context that the term was not
utilized to give those bays the legal status of the territorial sea, since the baselines of the
true territorial sea were to be drawn at their outer limits, thus distinguishing them from
the territorial sea properly so-called. Hence the term should be taken to indicate that an
analogy with land territory and the waters within the boundaries of the state, designating
the area of its full sovereign authority and competence, is intended.
8. Id. The tribunal added that Conception Bay should be found to be an historic bay
as this "was provided for by the decision of the Privy Council in the case of the Direct United
States Cable Co. v. The Anglo-American Telegraph Co., (1877) L. R. 2 App. Cas. 394 (P.C.)
in which decision the United States have acquiesced." North Atlantic Coast Fisheries, supra
note 6, at 188.
9. Fisheries Case, supra note l, at 116.
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concepts of historic bays and historic waters were not codified in
the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone 10 but were only made an exception to the Regime of
Bays provided in Article 7 of that Convention. Despite the fact that
publicists have long recognized the legal categories of historic bays
and, more generally, of historic title in ocean areas other than bays,
a recent publication of the Law of the Sea Institute of the University of Hawaii entitled Law of the Sea: Neglected Issues 11 neglected
to deal with the Third United Nations Conference's failure to agree
on a provision defining historic bays and other historic rights and
their legal scope and operation. This scholarly omission may be contrasted with the remarks of Mr. Rubio, representative of Panama
at the 1958 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea at
Geneva, which he uttered at the third meeting of the First Committee (this was, in fact, the first meeting at which matters of
substance were discussed). He said, after proposing that the Committee set up a sub-committee, that:
The International Law Commission's draft contained only a
passing reference to historic bays - in article 7, paragraph 4 - but
the Committee had before it a valuable Secretariat paper
(A/CO NF .13/1). The question of historic bays was of great importance, as had been recognized by eminent writers, including
Bustamente and Gidel. The latter regarded historic bays as a safety
10. Geneva Convention on the Territoriai Sea and the Contiguous Zone, done Apr.
29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 (effective Sept. 10, 1964)
[hereinafter cited as 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea].
11. Law of the Sea: Neglected Issues, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE LA w OF THE SEA INSTITUTE
TWELFTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE (J.K. Gamble, Jr. ed.1979). It is of further interest to note that
Bowen and Friedheim's introduction to the "Stage-Setting Session" entitled Neglected Issues
at the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference," sets forth in Figure 1 ("A Typology
of UNCLOS Neglect") "three reasons" for the neglect of their seven perceived issues as
follows:
Reason for Neglect
Issues
1. Too little known to consider as
• Non-nodule resource recovery
subject of regulation or
• Energy Resources beyond 200
management
mi. EEZ/margin
• Polar Regions
2. Issues too delicate or political
• Military Uses
3. UNCLOS inappropriate forum
•North Sea
•Airspace
• Navigation
Id. at 2, 6. Quite clearly, historic bays do not fit into any of the above three "reasons
for neglect," although, perhaps, the Conference's failure to agree may have arisen from
political factors.
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valve in the law of the sea, and considered that the refusal of States
to accept the theory would make it impossible to arrive at an agreement on general rules concerning maritime areas. State practice
in respect of historic bays was equally important; a number of bays
had been declared "historic" by international treaties or pronouncements of state authorities, and several had been recognized as such
by arbitral awards. 12

Be the events of the 1958 Conference as they may, the legal
concept of historic bays was, when at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea it came up for review, available for
reconsideration. A renewed possibility of codification one may have
thought, had become available. The net result was, however, that
this topic was the subject of only three oblique references in the
12. Statement of Mr. Rubio, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/1 (1958), reprinted in III UNITED
NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA OFFICIAL RECORDS, 74 (1958) [hereinafter cited
as III UNCLOS OFFICIAL RECORDS (1958)). See statements of Mr. Shukairi (Saudi Arabia) id.;
Mr. Bartos (Yugoslavia) id.; Mr. Martinez-Moreno (El Salvador) id. at 48. Also note the Annex
to the 21st Meeting Statement by Mr. J.P.A. Francois, Expert to the Secretariat of the
Conference where he stated (footnotes omitted):
13. As regards historic bays, the International Law Commission have given
no definition, for it thought that the concept was familiar to everyone concerned
with international law. Moreover, historic bays could be defined very satisfactorily
in the words of the International Court of Justice: "By 'historic waters' are usually
meant waters which are treated as internal waters but which would not have that
character were it not for the existence of an historic title." That definition is a
very innocuous one. If, however, it is desired to go farther and state the conditions which bays must satisfy in order to be considered historic bays, the matter
becomes much more complicated. It raises the whole problem of acquisition by prescription, and several uncertain points will then have to be cleared up. Is this "continued and well-established" usage, as the Institute of International Law called
it in 1894, or "international" usage, as the Institute called it in 1920? Or is it an
"uncontested" international usage, the word used in the 1928 draft? Must there
be "established" usage, as the International Law Association's draft of 1926 requires,
or established usage "generally recognized by nations," as required by the wording
finally adopted? Can the vital interests of the coastal State be the sole root of a
right? The 1930 Conference thought that, before beginning to study historic bays,
it should have before it information from all the States on the bays which they
claimed to be historic and the reasons for their claims.
14. The Secretariat's excellent memorandum [A/CONF.13/1) does not provide
us with the material needed for a thorough study of this question. I therefore do
not think it would be of any use to set up a sub-committee for that purpose, as
proposed by the delegation of Panama [3rd meeting]. In my opinion, the Conference
might merely use the term "historic bays" and leave it to be construed, in case
of dispute, by the Court, with due regard for all the features of the special case,
which could not possibly be provided for in a general rule. If necessary, the International Law Commission could be instructed to study acquisition by prescription,
with special reference to historic bays.
Id., U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/C, L.10 (1958), at 69.
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United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: 13 Article
10(6) provides that the twenty-four mile closing straight baseline
of bays does "not apply to so-called 'historic bays' ...." 14 ; Article
15 which recognizes the existence of historic title to waters by
excluding such waters from the operation of the equidistance rule
for which the Article provides, in the absence of agreement, for
the delimitation of the territorial seas between adjacent and opposite
states. 148 Historic waters are again recognized in Article 298(1) which
provides states parties with the capacity to invoke "optional exceptions to the applicability of Section 2" (which establishes compulsory dispute settlement procedures entailing binding decisions),
including disputes "involving historic bays or titles." This "optional
exception" may be invoked by a party to the treaty by making a
written declaration. On the other hand, alternative dispute settlement procedures become incumbent upon the parties where "no

13. Third United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec.
10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1982), reprint,ed in 21I.L.M.1261 (1982) [hereinafter cited
as 1982 Convention].
14. Id. art. 10(6). This formula for avoiding definition in Article 10(6) namely the
reference to "so-called 'historic' bays" (note the inverted commas around the qualifier
"historic"), was taken from Article 7(6) of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial
Sea and Contiguous Zone, supra note 10, and further back the Inter-American Council of
Jurists, "Principles of Mexico on the Juridical Regime of the Sea," approved at the Fourth
Plenary Session, February 3, 1956, which provided (as far as historic bays are concerned):

E.
Bays
5. So-called "historic bays" shall be subject to the regime of international waters
of the coastal state or states. McChesney, U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL LAW "BLUE BOOK" 246 (1957). Pan-American Union Doc. CIJ-29 at 38
(English).
The formula "so-called 'historic' bays" in the "Principles of Mexico" and the 1958
Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone regarding historic bays
was carried through into the drafts of the Third United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea. See, e.g. Statement of Activities of the Conference During its
First and Second Sessions, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/L. 8/REV. l, Annex II, Appendix
I. 3 THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA OFFICIAL RECORDS
110, U.N. Sales No.: E.75. V.5 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 3 UNCLOS III OFFICIAL
RECORDS (1975)) for the following formulations:
Provision 17
Formula A
The foregoing provisions shall not apply to so-called "historic" bays or in any case
where the straight baseline system provided for in article ... is applied.
Formula B
In the absence of other applicable rules the baselines of the territorial sea are
measured from the outer limits of historic bays or other historic waters.
14a. 1982 Convention, supra note 13, art. 15.
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agreement within a reasonable period of time is reached in negotiations between the parties." 14b
The reason for the two applicable United Nations-sponsored
international conventions (which were drafted with a view to the
codification of the relevant rules of the international law of the sea),
so signally failing to define the concept of historic bays, prescribe
how they may be acquired and determine the rights and duties
entailed, can be found in the United Nations International Law Commission's sense of indefiniteness when the need arose for the
formulation of the specific concept. It was also confronted by a
difficulty in reaching a consensus for casting into binding, indeed
mandatory language, the specific international law rules governing the topic. The Commission was, furthermore, confronted by
political problems which could not be resolved by the purely
juridical considerations informing the studies which the United
Nations Secretariat had prepared on the subject 15 or by other
entirely objective and equally excellent scientific expositions. While
these products of the study might provide guides to the strictly
legal issues, they were not capable of settling the rivalries which
would have been exacerbated by providing any form of words with
the authority of a code. Thus, the International Law Commission
and the two Conferences were unable to strike a satisfactory balance
between the interests of states with authentic claims to adjacent
sea areas based on long usage, and those of states that opposed
particular claims to historic bays which their neighbors asserted,
or states that in general imposed strict standards for the recognition of historic rights in order to vindicate the freedom of the seas
and oppose, as a matter of principle, the facilitation of enclosures
in ocean regions. 16
14b. Id. art. 298(1).
15. These studies were: (1) Historic Bays: Memorandum by the Secretariat of the United
Nations (Preparatory Document, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/1 (1957), reprinted in I UNITED
NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA OFFICIAL RECORDS 1 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/37,
U.N. Sales No. 58.V4, vol. 1 (1959) [hereinafter cited as I UNCLOS OFFICIAL RECORDS (1957)].
(2) United Nations Secretariat, Juridical Regimes of Historic Waters Including Historic Bays,
U.N. Doc. A!CN. 4/143 (9 March 1962), (1962] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. CoMM'N. 1 (1964).
16. There would appear to be a similar dearth of attempts at codifying this concept
by private scholars and organizations. True, one may find oblique references such as the
following:
Quant aux baies, y compris les embouchures des grands fleuves et aux fjords
ainsi qu'aux parties de la mer enfermees par des iles et des ilots, c'est une question d' histoires de savoir jusqu'a quelle mesure ils auront ete occupes par l'etat
riverain: car ii s'agit la vraiment de parcelles de la mer faisant partie integrante
du crops de l'etat.
RAESTAD. LA MER TERRITORIALE 171 (1913).
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Again, while the Third United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea finally failed to come up with a definitive and substantive article on historic bays, the topic was actively canvassed at
the Caracas (Second) Session of the Conference. For example, Mr.
Herrera Caceras (Honduras) observed, after noting that his country was : not a party to any of the Geneva (1958 Law of the Sea)
Conventions, that:
Honduras was one of three coastal States bordering on the
Gulf of Fonseca in the Pacific Ocean. That gulf was regulated
exclusively by existing delimitations and agreements between the
coastal States. The legal concept contained in article 7 of the 1958
Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone
would be applicable to that bay but for the exception laid down
in that article, i.e., that it related only "to bays the coasts of which
belong to a single State" and that it would not apply to so-called
"historic" bays. He regarded the latter provision as open to objection because of its discriminatory nature. It was discriminatory
to exclude bays which bordered the coasts of various States when,
as in the present case, all the coastal States maintained that the
waters of the bay were internal. Although there was no established
legal norm, the status of that bay had been accepted by the coastal
States. It had never been maintained that the entrance to the Gulf
of Fonseca was an international strait, which showed that the legal
unity of all parts of the bay was generally accepted. Moreover,
there was no valid reason for excluding from the legal concept of
bays the so-called "historic" bays in cases where the concept
applied to them. His delegation therefore maintained that the traditional concept of "historic" bays should be revised because it had
been elaborated in response to a former need for a legal definition of bays under the exclusive competence of the coastal State. 17

In addition, the Philippines representative, Mr. Abad Santos,
criticised the United Kingdom's draft articles on the territorial sea, 18
his grounds being that it made no mention of the impact on the
territorial sea of historic bays. 19 At the next meeting, however, Mr.
17. Statement of Mr. Herrera Caceras, II THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE
LAW OF THE SEA OFFICIAL RECORDS 100-01(1974) (hereinafter cited as II UN CLOS III OFFICIAL
RECORDS (1974)).
18. United Kingdom: draft articles on the Territorial Sea and Straights, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 62/C.2/L.3 (1974), reprinted in III THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW
OF THE SEA OFFICIAL RECORDS 183 (197 4) [hereinafter cited as III UN CLOS III OFFICIAL RECORDS
(1974)).
19. Statement of Mr. Abad Santos, reprinted in II UNCLOS III OFFICIAL RECORDS
(1974), supra note 17, at 102-03.
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Galindo Pohl (El Salvador) attacked Mr. Herrera Caceras's presentation, and raised the question whether "it was in order to discuss
bilateral issues." He saw the purpose of the debate as fulfilling "the
task of preparing general rules which would subsequently serve
as the basis for settling specific cases." 20 Be that as it may, the
representative of Guatemala (also a coastal state of the Gulf of
Fonseca), Mr. Santiso Galvez, was reported in the following terms:
"Finally, he wished to take the opportunity to repeat that the waters
of the historic Bay of Amatique were internal waters, and always
had been under the sovereignty of Guatemala." 21
But the dispute did not end with the intervention of the third
state-one interested in the status of the Gulf of Fonseca. Both Mr.
Herrera Caceras and Mr. Galindo Pohl had further comments to
make at this same fourth meeting. In brief, the three representatives agreed, in effect, that a dispute over the Gulf existed
between the three littoral countries 22 -Nicaragua, Honduras and
El Salvador. Thus, after two studies by the United Nations
Secretariat and three United Nations Conferences on the Law of
the Sea, the world seems as far as ever from finding a universally
acceptable definition of the concept. It is, therefore, necessary to
turn from asking why this should be so to an inquiry _w hether the
legal doctrine may be the subject of a general definition and, if not,
whether there is, in fact, validity to claims such as those of the
United States in terms of the Chesapeake and Delaware Bays on
grounds of historic title, or whether alternative bases of sovereignty
and authority over them exjst, and have existed from the earliest
times of this country's nationhood, or whether changes in United
States policy have dictated changes in characterizing the legal bases
for asserting territorial sovereignty over these reaches of internal
waters.

III. BASIC ISSUES
In understanding the strange opposition between the writers
and the case law on the one hand, and the codification conferences
on the other, it is necessary to begin the requisite analytical review
by presenting the basic notions which publicists, judges and
arbitrators have canvassed on the general question of historic bays.
20. Id. at 104.
21. Id. at 106.
22. Id. at 108. Other representatives who canvassed ideas on historic bays included
Mr. Abad Santos (Philippines). Id. at 111.
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As with all historic titles, whether by occupatio rei nullius, or alternatively by prescription good against the world community, there
must be an effective exercise of sovereign~y over the area in question. Secondly, the claim must be acquiesced in, or recognized, or
perhaps just tolerated by the world community. (There is debate
on this point with regard to the degree of non-opposition.) Thirdly,
there is the challenging question of the effectiveness of control. This
element is a variable one. Fourthly, this paper will examine the
kind of rights that the coastal state may demand over these sea
areas, and so may assert against all other states. Having raised
these elementary points, the discussion will then touch on the question of the relevance, which some scholars and states assert, of the
vital interests of the coastal state to the acquisition of historic titles
over bays and other maritime areas. Fifthly, the question of time
is important: both with regard to periods of time and the frequency
of the sovereign acts of the coastal state. Sixthly, some thoughts
will be tentatively offered regarding the burden of proof. Then,
finally, after this groundwork has been laid, the initial question will
be raised once again, namely, whether a comprehensive formulation governing historic bays in general is practicable; in the sense
of being acceptable to the world community.

IV. EFFECTIVENESS,
ACQUIESCENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY
In international law, as in all legal systems, effectiveness is
an essential element. Indeed the existence of the state itself is determined by the effectiveness of its capacity to exercise and display
its authority and maintain its sovereign independence as a state
over its territory and population. But effectiveness itself is a doctrine which confronts, in dialectical opposition, the old legal Latin
maxim ex injuria non oritur jus with its Latin negation and the
lawyer's morally jejune tag factus facit jus. These two concepts are
contradictory, yet their dialectical interaction over time provides
the stuff out of which law and legal rights grow. Emphasis on one,
so as to deny validity to the other, is, I strongly suggest, only
stressed by authorities who wish to develop a theory of law based
exclusively on the former (utopianism) or the latter (Hobbesian
power) rather than accept their dynamic interaction. Obviously if
one asserts that ex in}uria non oritur jus provides a fundamental
rule of law, the premise of an argument that prescriptive rights
may not be legally obtained is laid. The claims of an individual, a
Published by SURFACE, 1984
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neighbor or a group of neighboring states to prescriptive rights
arise out of an initial inJuria or a wrongful act. Again, we know
that we should not accept wrongful acts as destructive of rights
which are to be protected under the United Nations Charterespecially when those wrongful acts establish new rights for which
the protection of the Charter is claimed. But such an argument flies
in the face of legal history and all experience. It is here that the
issue of acquiescence becomes important. When the community of
states acquiesces in the assertion of claims, because the assertion
is at a minimal cost to the world community's rights such as, for
example, a claim that a bay in a distant ocean without traffic is
an historic bay, the balance of convenience and equity favors the
enclosure. (Spencer's Gulf in Australia may provide one example;
Hudson's Bay in the Canadian Arctic may provide another.) Yet
when the "injuria" is great enough, it is assumed there will be nonacquiescence. But where acquiescence is found to exist, despite the
"injuria," title usually depends on the degree of "injuria" in
counterpoint to the level of the cost of acquiescence. Effectiveness
thus provides the political test for the validity of legal rights.
Is acquiescence an essential element to the formulation of
historic title and rights? Some writers tell us yes, on the other hand,
the majority of the International Court of Justice, in the AngloNorwegian Fisheries Case, said that it was enough that the
Norwegian baseline claims were tolerated. 23 Toleration is not
acquiescence. It implies a far less exacting standard. Simply to do
nothing may not be acquiescence. Non-reaction can be (and was in
the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case) taken as tolerance. This observation gives rise to a further test. Lawyers all know that equity
frowns on the abuse of faith. A claim based on a failure to respect
the equity of reliance is generally labeled "injurious reliance."
Where a state in international law, or a person in private law, "has
slept on their rights" and has allowed another person to act on the
assumption that a certain condition of fact exists, and the other
person has so acted upon perceiving and being encouraged by the
silence of the first, then that first person cannot later, when the
second person has altered his or its position relying on that silence,
turn around and demand that the acts done (with its silent tolerance)
be undone, or form the basis of a claim of injury. Underlying the
23. Fisheries Case, supa note 1, at 138: "The general toleration of foreign states with
regard to the Norwegian practice is an unchallenged fact." See also id. at 139: "the general
toleration of international community."
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verbal debate about · tolerance, as used in the Anglo-Norwegian
Fisheries Case, and acquiescence, which we find in most of the
publicists, there is the value judgment that a state should not be
permitted to allow a situation to continue once it has decided that
such a state of affairs is contrary to its legally protected interests
and, as such, should form the basis of a timely protest. Tolerance
is thus a failure to protest against a known state of affairs, notwithstanding the injured state's appraisal of the potential effectiveness, or ineffectiveness of making such a protest.
An effective protest must be strongly made. A pro forrna or
paper protest is not enough. It should be emphatic and point to the
rights invaded in no uncertain or ambiguous terms and, if necessary,
be insistently repeated so as to lead to negotiations, or, in the alternative, to induce the characterization of the other state's conduct
as intractably unreasonable or even as aggressive. Otherwise, a simple paper protest establishes no more than an adverseness of the
claimant state's assertion of right to the protesting state. This, of
course, may strengthen, rather than undermine, the adverse claim,
for a paper protest provides an insufficient basis for protecting a
valid legal right constituting part of the status quo. It is also insufficient for demanding, effectively, a halt to the process of the creation of an adverse historic right. Finally, in the context of
acquiescence and tolerance, the question of recognition arises. While
the recognition of a right may provide a reinforcement for the
establishment of a right, its converse, namely the refusal of recognition, may provide a very feeble obstacle to the process of claim
whereby a coastal state accumulates instances for asserting a right,
for example, to an historic bay. The simple refusal of recognition
could be ineffective to half the ongoing and cumulative process of
the historic consolidation of title if, under the Fisheries Case ruling,
tolerance is enough; a state may and often does, in effect, tolerate
a situation it does not recognize. Indeed the court's view of the
British inaction with regard to Norway's fisheries claims and those
rights' assertion through the Royal Decrees illustrates this
distinction.
Is prescription relevant to claiming historic bays? Professor
D.H.N. Johnson, amongst other writers, has asserted that a historic
bay can only be lawfully acquired by a coastal state by means of
the application of international rules of acquisitive prescription. 24
24. Johnson, Acquisitive Prescription in International Law, 27 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.1950
332 (1951); Johnson, Consolidation as a Root of Title in International Law, CAMBRIDGE L.J.
215 (1955).
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In Professor Johnson's view, moreover, the prescription which is
essential in such cases is not a prescriptive right against one or
two neighboring states, but one good against the world community.
Starting from the point that the high seas are free, we must
necessarily be talking about a world community right to exercise
the freedom of the high seas in the sense of all nations' free access
to use it as a spatial resource for transportation and to gather its
other resources. Professor Johnson sees the high seas, in addition,
as a commons whose common resources may be individually
exploited in common. The establishment of rights inconsistent with
these world community rights can only be effectuated, according
to Johnson, by means of the satisfaction of the hard requirements
of a prescription good against the whole world. Professor Johnson's
thesis is criticised, although not in name, in the United Nations Study
on Historic Bays. This latter study points out~ quite correctly it is
suggested, that in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case the idea of
acquisitive prescription was rejected, in effect, by the International
Court. One relevant Norwegian interpretation (and many other
states' interpretation as well) of the judgment was that the
Norwegian claims had survived as a limited residue from the age
of mare clausum when the Dano-Norwegian kings clai_m ed the socalled Norwegian Sea as being subject to their sovereignty, and
that the historic right therefore had nothing to do with prescription, but was simply the consolidation of shrunken rights which had
been maintained over the centuries, and were finally enunciated
in the Royal Decrees of 1935. These ancient claims, so this argument runs, residually survive as Norway's rights over the waters
enclosed by her Skerryguard.
It is also true to say that there are other bays or historic waters
in the world, apart from the coastal waters of Norway, where the
coastal state's jurisdiction may be seen as pre-dating the arrival
and supremacy of the doctrine of the freedom of the high seas.
Examples include the traditional exercise of sovereignty over the
Gulf of Manaar and Palk's Bay between India and Ceylon. Both of
these have, from ancient times, been treated as subject to the
sovereignty of the rulers of Ceylon, now Sri Lanka. 25 Today Sri
Lanka claims those bays as the successor to the British Raj which,
in its turn, claimed those bays as enclosed waters by virtue of being
25. See Ceylon Ordinance No. 6 of 1933, 4 CEYLON LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS ch. 168
(1938). Annakumaru Pillai v. Muthupayal, 28 INDIAN L. REV. 551 (1904).
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the successor to the Dutch, the Portuguese and the ancient kings
of the island who had, since time immemorial, exercised sovereignty
and authority over the pearl fisheries of those enclosed waters. It
is also true to say that in a number of other maritime areas similar
rights have survived from the earlier periods of the history of
international law. For example, certain rights to particular sedentary fisheries (coral and sponge) in the southern Mediterranean have
fallen under the historic rights of such coastal states as Tunisia,
Libya and Egypt. These may be seen as having come down to the
present as survivals of the rights asserted by the rulers of those
states under Islamic law. Pre-dating contemporary public international law, they have little or nothing to do with our ideas of the
Roman law rights upon which Hugo Grotius and his contemporaries
and followers relied when they acclaimed it as raJio serif.pa.. Nor
did the evolution of the doctrine of the freedom of the high seas
amongst Western European states have a similar impact upon these
Buddhist, Islamic, and other non-Western states so as to limit or
restrict their earlier extensive maritime rights.
In light of the foregoing, it seems feasible to observe that
historic bays stem from a number of separate theories of law. One,
indeed, is their creation alternatively either by way of a prescriptive right or by the tolerance of other states. This assertion can
more confidently be made with regard to historic bays in Europe
and in North America and especially the Bay of Granville (Cancalc)
off the coasts of Brittany and Normandy, Conception Bay in North
America, as well as many others. Their status as historic bays may
be seen as the product of historic rights. It is not, however, of
universal significance. What may be true of the Bay of Cancale may
not necessarily be true of the Gulf of Manaar. It is also not true
of bays whose coastal states may assert historic title over them
on the southern shore of the Mediterranean Sea, and whose title
may stem from a different legal regime (that of Islam) from that
of a purely European provenance.
Having referred, briefly, to historic maritime rights existing
under different historical regimes (namely those derived from Islam)
on the African coasts of the Mediterranean, a further clarification
becomes necessary. At the moment the evidence has not been
presented which would establish the Gulf of Sirte as an historic
bay. Furthermore, aerial and naval incidents of the recent past.
indicate that any such claim has not been tolerated by stah~s which
are prepared to vindicate their rights of free navigation on the free

Published by SURFACE, 1984

15

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 11, No. 2 [1984], Art. 3

226

Syr. J. Int'I L. & Com.

[Vol. 11:211

high seas. But, on the other hand, the Libyan claim to the Gulf of
Sirte could be an interesting subject of study. It would be
interesting because, while the policy and authority of the Kingdom
of Italy during the period when Libya was subject to the
sovereignty of that state would be relevant, it would not be conclusive. On the other hand, evidence of state practice stemming from
the policies of rulers in the pre-colonial era may well be more
effective, provided a record of these could be substantiated.
More generally, a decolonization argument, rejecting colonial
power's policies, furthermore, could, indeed, be formulated so as
to assert that a colonial power should not be able to terminate, for
the indefinite future, and for purpose of its own interests, the rights
of the colonized community or state which has fallen under its
sovereignty. There is some truth in this, but such an argument
would, of course, still have to look at the evidence about whether
Italy asserted, or negotiated away, for its own interests, a preexisting historic right. Secondly, it should be asked whether the
historic right now asserted over the Gulf of Sirte ever existed under
Islamic law in the first place. On the basis of insufficient evidence,
perhaps, and before ever having had the opportunity to study the
history of the Gulf of Sirte, it is highly probable that historic rights
never were effectively consolidated under Islamic law. So, possibly,
Italy never believed that she could assert a lawful claim to the Gulf
of Sirte as an historic bay. This is distinguishable from the legal
character of certain other smaller bays of North Africa, especially
those on the Tunisian coast, where fishing by means of traps, sponge
fisheries and shell fisheries of sea-bottom creatures of all kinds have
been strictly regulated. These sea areas bear analogies with the
pearl fisheries in the Persian Gulf which have been, since time
immemorial, strictly regulated by the coastal prince or sovereign.

V. THE "VITAL INTERESTS" OF THE COASTAL STATE
Some writers have asserted that the establishment of historic
rights over bays and offshore waters may arise from the vital interests of the coastal state. Can, for example, an historic bay be
created by means of asserting that to exercise sovereign power over
the bay is of vital interest to the coastal state? We come here to
the assertion that vital interests can create historic title.
At the First Codification Conference of 1930 at The Hague, for
example, the Portuguese representative stated the following point
of view:
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol11/iss2/3
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From a variety of circumstances, the state to which the bay belongs
finds it necessary to exercise full sovereignty over it without
restriction or hindrance. The considerations which justify their
claim are security and defense of the land territory and ports, and
the well-being and even existence of the state. 26

The present government of the Libyan Peoples Arab
Jamahirayah has, as a result of United States Navy exercises,
asserted that ~he Gulf of Sirte is an historic bay. By this means
Libya has claimed to enclose it in order to bring it within its
domestic territorial jurisdiction. The argument adduced in support
of this assertion is that the Gulfs incorporation represents an essentially vital interest of Libya.
The argument that the vital interests of the coastal state should
also provide a basis for enclosing a bay within the territory of the
coastal state and for, further, classing it as "historic" was first put
forward by Dr. Drago, the famous Argentinian international lawyer
of the pre-World War I era. He argued that such great river
estuaries as the Rio de la Plata and the mouths of the Orinoco and
the Amazon should be regarded as historic bays of the Latin countries from whose shores those rivers debouch, 27 on the ground that
to find otherwise would be unfair to newly decolonized states.
(Incidentally, in saying these words with regard to Latin America,
Dr. Drago was employing contemporary language long before the
present age of decolonization.) It is true to say, whatever other
justification a coastal state may give in terms of its vital interests
for enclosing such bays within its sovereign territory, the features
should not be called historic bays. To label them so does unnecessary
violence to the requirement that this characterization must have
a meaningful basis in history. History does not spring like Pallas
Athena fully armed, and complete, from the head of Jove. Nor can
an interest be based both on arguments of historic development
and on criteria which have no relevant need for a time dimension.
Rather, an historic title unrolls, evolves, and is consolidated.
Accordingly, to try to fit such claims as Dr. Drago's vital interests
argument and indeed, those of the Portuguese government at The
26. Statement by the Portuguese government at the First Codification Conference
at The Hague, League of Nations Doc. C. 74. M.39.1919V, at 184.
27. See, e.g., Judge Drago's dissent in Proceedings in the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries
Arbitration, S. Doc. No. 870, 61st Cong., 3rd Sess. 519 (1912) [hereinafter cited as North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Arbitration); Brierly, Vital Interests and the Law, 21 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
51 (1944).
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Hague Codification Conference of 1930 (which again raised the issues
of vital interest being a basis for asserting historic bays)28 should
be sympathetically turned aside as contradictory of the essential
meaning of the term "historic bays." It emphatically negates the
unfolding and consolidating elements of the concept. Hence language
and definition, authority and justice effectively negate any historic
claim to enclose a sea area merely on the premise of the vital
interests of the coastal state while, of course, vital interests may,
on other grounds strongly justify the establishment of some kind
of maritime protective jurisdiction. Alternative justifications should
be established which do not do violence to the very name and
category of an historic bay. Surely if a claim is asserted for the
purpose of defense, or for obtaining exclusive control of valuable
offshore resources, vital interests may today well vindicate claims
under alternative legal concepts to that of historic bays.
The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,
long before December 1982 (when the Convention was accepted by
the great majority of negotiating states) had, for example, already
accepted the theory of archipelagic waters. Today few people would
deny that an emerging customary international law rule, which is
in the process of ascribing their archipelagic waters to island states,
is unfolding before our very eyes. Then again, the twenty-four mile
closing line for bays has come to be accepted as part of general
international law. This may seem a modest closing line to many,
but in the early days of this century it would have been regarded
as the greatest extravagance. At that time the closing line of bays
was widely held to be limited to double the distance of the breadth
of the territorial sea- no more than six miles. Then again, and particularly with regard to vitally needed offshore fisheries such as
those asserted by Chile, Ecuador and Peru in regard to the
resources of the Humboldt Current, an alternative regime to that
of historic bays is called into play to protect exclusive claims. Today
we also hear of the 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone. Surely this
constitutes a far more generous recognition of the vital interests
of the coastal state in a maritime region than the concept of historic
bays? Then again on the issue of defense, surely, we cannot leave
out of consideration the whole system of air traffic control and the
authority over approaching aircraft in terms of what is called, in
the United States, the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). This
28. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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reaches a distance of 500-miles off the East and West Coasts of
America. Similarly, national interests are protected by the so-called
Dew Line combining the security interests of Canada and the United
States with regard to the Arctic. In this context, it should be noted
that no state has protested against the exercise of authority in the
ADIZ. Parallels of these assertions of national authority to vindicate
the national security of the coastal state are to be found on every
continent. In fact, every developing and developed state today is
not only entitled to exercise such power, but has a duty to engage
in air traffic control to maintain international air traffic safety when
aircraft approach its shores, otherwise there would be worse air
traffic congestion and greater risk of catastrophic accidents than
we would ever experience on the crowded highways of Europe and
North America. Before focusing attention onto historic bays for the
protection of vital interests, policy makers might do well to
remember that there are other and possibly more functional concepts available for the protection of vital interests without making
a fiction of history or a distortion of the past.
VI. FIVE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES
A.

BACKGROUND

Since 1945 a considerable volume of litigation has taken place
regarding the delimitation, inter se, of the offshore continental shelf
areas appertaining to the United States. The first round of
litigation29 chiefly involved domestic constitutional law rather than
public international law questions, and in the three cases that these
issues arose, the Supreme Court of the United States found that
the United States, rather than the littoral states, had gained
dominion and control over the seabed and subsoil of the three-mile
territorial belt (except in the case of United States v. Louisiana30
where the state's claim had been to a twenty-seven mile belt). As

29. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947); United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S.
699 (1950); United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950).
30. 339 U.S. 699. This claim of land underlying a three leagues belt of territorial sea
was reiterated in United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, reh'g denied, 364 U.S. 856 (1960),
modified, 382 U.S. 288 (1965), but only vindicated for the seaward boundaries of Texas,
Alabama, Louisiana and Mississippi. In United States v. Florida, 363 U.S. 121 (1960), the
Supreme Court found that the Submerged Lands Act of 1953 granted Florida a three marineleague belt of land under the Gulf of Mexico lying seaward of its coastline. But this Spanish
measurement giving additional breadth to the territorial sea did not apply to the waters
of Florida's Atlantic coast.
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Justice Douglas pointed out in United States v. California: "Not only
has acquisition, as it were, of the three-mile belt been accomplished
by the National Government, but protection and control of it has
been and is a function of external sovereignty." 31
B. THE SUBMERGED LANDS ACT
As a result of the holdings of the Supreme Court in the
California, Louisiana, and Texas cases, the Congress enacted the
Submerged Lands Act in 195332 that "quit-claimed" and "released"
to the states all rights to lands beneath navigable waters out to
the outer limits of the three-mile marginal sea or, with regard to
the states bordering on the Gulf of Mexico, to their outer boundaries if more than three miles offshore.
With regard to historic bays, there is no express mention in
the Act, as finally passed, of these legal entities, although earlier
versions of the bill did mention them. In the Act, Section 2(c) defines
"coast line" as "the line of ordinary low water along that portion
of the coast which is in direct contact with the open sea and the
line marking the seaward limit of inland waters."33 It should be noted
that in the first draft of the bill inland waters were defined as
including: "all estuaries, ports, harbors, bays, channels, straits,
historic bays, and sounds, and all other bodies of water which join
the open sea."
But this definition was removed by the Senate Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs. 34 In United States v. California,
moreover, the Supreme Court observed that the above definition
was eliminated "on grounds that it would prejudice and limit the
position which the United States could take in its future conduct
of foreign affairs." 35
After the enactment of the Submerged Lands Act, and apart
from one lawsuit which was brought by states lacking a coastline
and hence the possibility of benefiting from the Act and which
attacked the constitutionality of the Act on the ground that ceding
31. 332 U.S. at 38.
32. The Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. SS 1301-15 (1982). See also The Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. SS 1331-46 (1982), which provided for the jurisdiction of the United States over the "Outer Continental Shelf' (defined as areas seaward of
those "quitclaimed" to the states by the Submerged Lands Act) and authorized the Secretary
of the Interior to lease such areas for exploration and exploitation purposes.
33. Submerged Lands Act of 1953, S 2(c), 43 U.S.C. S 1301 (1982).
34. S. REP. No. 133, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., at 18.
35. 381 u.s. 139, 151 (1965).
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the submerged lands to individual states would take away the "equal
footing" among states by extending state power into the domain
of federal responsibility ,36 litigation was between the coastal states
benefiting from the Act and the United States. This litigation fell
into two categories: (1) disputes as to the width of the quitclaimed
lands under the marginal sea37 in the Gulf of Mexico; and (2) the
definition of the baselines from which the territorial sea and, hence,
the lands included within the Submerged Lands Act's "quitclaim"
should be measured. While the disputes with respect to the width
of the coastal state's territorial sea do not include historic bays
issues, those involving baselines do. In this respect five cases are
of interest, namely: United States v. California, 38 United States v.
Louisiana (Louisiana Boundary Case}, 39 United States v. Florida, 40
United States v. Maine, 41 United States v. Alaska. 42
C.

AN OUTLINE OF THE FIVE SUBMERGED LANDS CASES
RELATING TO HISTORIC BAYS AND HISTORIC WATERS

At the outset it should be noted that, in the first of these five
cases (namely United States v. California43 ), the Supreme Court held
that "Congress, in passing the Act, left the responsibility for defining inland waters to this Court. We think that it did not tie our
hands at the same time." 44 This thesis was predicated on the more
36. Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272, 274 (1954) (Reed, J., concurring).
37. United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. at 1. It should be noted that in this case Justice
Harlan observed, for the Court, that "there is no question of Congress' power to fix state
land and water boundaries as a domestic matter." Id. at 35. See also United States v. Louisiana, 389 U.S. 155 (1967), reh'g denied, 389 U.S. 1059 (1968) in which the State of Texas claimed
that the baselines of its three-league territorial sea should be measured from the seaward
edge of artificial jetties. Under this argument the Submerged Lands Act of 1953 would be
seen to quitclaim, to the State of Texas, the submerged lands lying more than three leagues
from those jetties (as well as three leagues from the shoreline where the jetties do not create
the greater belt of quitclaimed submerged lands). The argument failed. The Supreme Court
held that the three-league belt must be measured by the boundary which existed in 1845,
when Texas was admitted to the Union, and not from the jetties which were built long
thereafter.
38. U.S. v. California, 381U.S.139, reh'g denied, 382 U.S. 889 (1965), modified, 382 U.S.
448, (1966), modified, 432 U.S. 40 (1977).
39. U.S. v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11, reh'g denied, 394 U.S. 994, modified, 394 U.S. 1,
modified, 394 U.S. 836 (1969).
40. U.S. v. Florida, 420 U.S. 531 (1975).
41. U.S. v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515 (1975).
42. U.S. v. Alaska, 422 U.S. 184, reh'g denied, 423 U.S. 885, on remand, 519 F.2d 1376
(1975).
43. 381 U.S. at 139.
44. Id. at 164, 150-51.
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general foundation of the separation of powers. In the 1960 United
States v. Louisiana case the Court had said:
The power to admit new states resides in Congress. The President, on the other hand, is the constitutional representative of the
United States in its dealings with foreign nations. From the former
springs the power to establish state boundaries; from the latter
comes the power to determine how far this country will claim territorial rights in the marginal sea as against other nations. Any
such determination is, of course, binding on the states. The exercise of Congress' power to admit new states, while it may have
international consequences, also entails consequences as between
Nation and State. We need not decide whether action by Congress
fixing a state's territorial boundary more than three miles beyond
its coast constitutes an overriding determination that the state,
and therefore this country, are to claim that much territory against
foreign nations. It is sufficient for present purposes to note that
there is no question of Congress' power to fix state land and water
boundaries as a domestic matter. Such a boundary, fully effective
as between Nation and State, undoubtedly circumscribes the
extent of navigable inland.waters and underlying lands owned by
the state under the Pollard rule. Were that rule applicable also
to the marginal sea- the premise on which Congress proceeded
in enacting the Submerged Lands Act-it is clear that such a boundary would be similarly effective to circumscribe the extent of
submerged lands beyond low-water mark, and within the limits of
the Continental Shelf, owned by the state. For, as the Government
readily concedes, the right to exercise jurisdiction and control over
the seabed and subsoil of the Continental Shelf is not
internationally restricted by the limit of territorial waters.
We conclude that, consonant with the purpose of Congress
to grant to the states, subject to the three-league limitation, the
lands they would have owned had the Pollard rule been held
applicable to the marginal sea, a state territorial boundary beyond
three miles is established for purposes of the Submerged Lands
Act by Congressional action so fixing it, irrespective of the limit
of territorial waters. 45

But while the Court left to the United States complete discretion in deciding whether or not to extend its boundaries to the furthest extent permitted under international law, it saw, in United
States v. California, 46 a partial exception to that proposition with
45. See Louisiana, 363 U.S. at 35-36.
46. 381 U.S. at 139.
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regard to historic bays. It observed that there could be situations
where a United States title to a bay would not "be decisive in all
circumstances, for a case might arise in which the historic title was
clear beyond doubt."'7
1.

United States v. California'8

In the first case relating to offshore submerged lands, which
had been decided in 1947,'9 the decision related to the ownership,
under the Constitution of the United States, of those lands. This
second case sought the interpretation of the relevant provisions
of the Submerged Lands Act and, in .particular, the meaning of the
term "inland waters." California claimed, as historic waters (bays)
of the state, the following sea areas:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

Crescent City Bay
Monterey Bay50
San Luis Obispo Bay
Santa Monica Bay51
San Pedro Bay52
Newport Bay

California also claimed the following expanses of the Pacific
Ocean as "inland" (internal) waters of the State, on the precedent
of the Norwegian Fisheries Case53 and the authority of Article 4
of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone. 54 The
latter provides for the use of straight baselines if the "coast line
is deeply indented and cut into, or if there is a fringe of islands

47. Id. at 175. The Court added, "[b]ut in the case before us, with its questionable
evidence of continuous and exclusive assertions of dominion over the disputed waters, we
think the disclaimer decisive." Id.
48. 381 U.S. at 139.
49. 332 U.S. at 19.
50. California's claim, at least in part, that Monterey Bay appertained to her on the
basis of its being a historic bay turned on one state court and one federal court decision,
namely, Ocean Industries, Inc. v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. 235, 252 P. 722 (1927), and Ocean
Industries, Inc. v. Greene, 15 F.2d 862 (N.D. Cal. 1926).
51. California's similar claim to Santa Monica Bay turned on a state court decision
in People v. Stralla, 14 Cal. 2d 617, 96 P.2d 941 (1939) (finding that the Sheriff of Los Angeles
County could make an arrest more than three miles from the shorf> line, but within the body
of the Bay).
52. The California claim to San Pedro Bay was predicated in part, on United States
v. Carrillo, 13 F. Supp. 121 (S.D. Cal. 1935).
53. Fisheries Case, supra note 1, at 116.
54. 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 10, art. 4.
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along the coast in its immediate vicinity ." 55 Accordingly, California
argued that she was free to use such boundary lines across the opening of her bays and around her islands and, in particular, the
following:
(1) The first area runs from Bodega Head, to Point Reyes,
to the outermost inlet of the Farallon Islands and thence to
Pescadoro Point
(2) Half Moon Bay
(3) Morro Bay
(4) The second such area runs from Point Arguello to Point
Conception
(5) California's third claim, namely to the "overall unit area,"
runs from Point Conception to Richardson Rock (21 miles across
water), to San Miguel Island, to Santa Rosa Island, to Gull Island,
to San Clemente Island (43 miles); thence back to the mainland at
Point Loma (56.8 miles). San Nicolas and San Clemente Islands are
over 50 miles from shore. 56 (It should be noted that this "overall
unit area" embraces inter alia, the Santa Barbara channel, Santa
Monica Bay and Newport Bay but, of course, extends far beyond
them.)

California reinforced her claims, where possible,. by arguing
that all bays with a closing line of 24 sea miles or less enclosed
55. Article 4 provides:
1. In localities ~here the coast line is deeply indented and cut into, or if there
is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity, the method of straight
baselines joining appropriate points may be employed in drawing the baseline from
which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.
2. The drawing of such baselines must not depart to any appreciable extent from
the general direction of the coast, and the sea areas lying within the lines must
be sufficiently closely linked to the land domain to be subject to the regime of
internal waters.
3. Baseline shall not be drawn to and from low-tide elevations, unless lighthouses
or similar installations which are permanently above sea level have been built on
them.
4. Where the method of straight baselines is applicable under the provisions of
paragraph l, account may be taken, in determining particular baselines, of economic
interests peculiar to the region concerned, the reality and the importance of which
are clearly evidenced by a long usage.
5. The system of straight baselines may not be applied by a State in such a manner as to cut off from the high seas the territorial sea of another State.
6. The coastal State must clearly indicate straight baselines on charts, to which
due publicity must be given.

Id.
56. See 381 U.S. at 178 (Black, J., dissenting) (Map in Appendix C). The Appendices
follow page 213 of the Report.
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internal or "inland" waters - hereinafter referred to as "juridical
bays" and justified under Article 7 of the 1958 Geneva Convention
on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone.57 In particular Monterey
Bay fell within this category. More generally, however, California
argued that the state's internal or "inland" waters were established
under her constitution and legislation. 158 But the Court, recalling its
rationale in the 1947 United States v. California decision, 59 asserted
57. Article 7 of the Convention is as follows:
1. This article relates only to bays the coasts of which belong to a single State.

2. For the purposes of these articles, a bay is a well-marked indentation whose
penetration is in such proportion to the width of its mouth as to contain landlocked
waters and constitute more than a mere curvature of the coast. An indentation
shall not, however, be regarded as a bay unless its area is as large as, or larger
than, that of the semi-circle whose diameter is a line drawn across the mouth of
that indentation.
3. For the purpose of measurement, the area of indentation is that lying between
the low-water mark around the shore of the indentation and a line joining the lowwater marks of its natural entrance points. Where, because of the presence of
islands, an indentation has more than one mouth, the semi-circle shall be drawn
on a line as long as the sum total of the lengths of the lines across the different
mouths. Islands within an indentation shall be included as if they were part of the
water areas of the indentation.
4. If the distance between the low-water marks of the natural entrance points of
a bay does not exceed twenty-four miles, a closing line may be drawn between
these two low-water marks, and the waters enclosed thereby shall be considered
as internal waters.
5. Where the distance between the low-water marks of the natural entrance points
of a bay exceeds twenty-four miles, a straight baseline of twenty-four miles shall
be drawn within the bay in such a manner as to enclose the maximum area of waters
that is possible with a line of that length.
6. The foregoing provisions shall not apply to so-called "historic" bays, or in any
case where the straight baseline system provided for in article 4 is applied.
1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 10, art. 7.
58. See. e.g., 381 U.S. at 153 where the Court correctly credited California with the
following argument:
"[I]nland waters" [in the Submerged Lands Act] must have been intended to
encompass all waters which the States "thought" were inland waters, for that is
the only way in which the Act can now be interpreted to effectuate fully its supposed "philosophy" of granting to the States all submerged lands within their
historic boundaries.
59. 332 U.S. at 19. See id. at 35-36 (footnotes omitted) where the Court states:
The ocean~ even its three-mile belt, is thus of vital consequence to the nation in
its desire to engage in commerce and to live in peace with the world; it also becomes
of crucial importance should it ever again become impossible to preserve that peace.
And as peace and world commerce are the paramount responsibilities of the nation,
rather than an individual state, so if wars come, they must be fought by the nation .
. . . The state is not equipped in our constitutional system with the powers or the
facilities for exercising the responsibilities which would be concomitant with the
dominion which it seeks. Conceding that the state has been authorized to exercise
local police power functions in the part of the marginal belt within its declared
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that the definition of inland waters was for the Union and not for
the several states to determine and, further, that since the date
of the decree of the first California case, the issue has become
settled by the United States' ratification of the Convention on the
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone on March 24, 1961 and the consequential adoption of the definitions therein. Hence the Court
applied the "Boggs Formula," 60 namely the 24~mile maximum closing line for bays plus the "semicircle" test for determining the baylike characteristics of the water area enclosed. Finally, the Court
decided that the choice of asserting claims to inland waters on the
basis of Article 4's straight baselines was for the United States in
her conduct of international relations to decide, and not for the
several states. Applying these principles, the Court found that of
all the disputed sea areas only Monterey Bay should be classified
as inland waters and, hence, as appertaining to the State of
California. (Monterey Bay has a closing line of 19.24 miles across
its entrance from headland to headland.) On the other hand, none
of the other coastal segments which California claimed met the
Court's tests. Hence they did not fall to that State as constituting
a part of its territory. Accordingly, their outer limits did not constitute the "coast line" of the state from which the statutorily
quitclaimed three mile belt of state submerged lands would have
been measured, as claimed by California.
2. United States v. Louisiana (Louisiana Boundary Case)6 1
In the immediately preceding case, United States v. Louisiana
(Texas Boundary Case), 62 the Supreme Court applied its holding in
boundaries, these do not detract from the Federal Government's paramount rights
in and power over this area.
60. The "Boggs Formula" follows the proposed definition by Dr. S. Whittemore Boggs,
Geographer, Department of State, in his influential article, Boggs, Delimitation of the Territorial Sea, 24 AM. J. INT'L L. 541, (1930). In that article Boggs wrote:
[T]he American proposal is to use a method inside the indentations which is exactly
similar to the drawing of the arcs of circles from all points along the coast. . . .
It is drawn, however, not with a radius of three miles but with a radius that is
proportionate to the width of the entrance. A comparison is then made between
the area enclosed by the envelope of the arcs of circles and the straight line across
the entrance ... and the area of a semi-circle whose diameter is proportionate
to the width of the entrance. When the area of the special "envelope" inside the
bay exceeds the area of the semi-circle, the waters inside the straight line are national waters, and the three-mile limit is measured from the straight line.
Id. at 550.
61. 394 U.S. at 11.
62. 394 U.S. at 1.
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United States v. California. 63 In that earlier case it decided that,
apart from the special circumstances where straight baselines are
permitted, the submerged lands quitclaimed to the states in the
Submerged Lands Act should be measured from the "line of
ordinary low water." 64 In the Texas Boundary Case it decided that
the coastline referred to in the Act was "ambulatory" in that it
should be viewed as being modified as the extensive erosion and
accretion of its shores modified the low water mark which provided
the datum for measuring the quitclaimed submerged lands.
While the low water mark rule was still seen as basic in the
Louisiana Boundary Case, the Court did agree that parts of the Louisiana coastline should be drawn by straight baselines marking "the
seaward limit of inland waters." 65 In determining the areas to be
so characterized the Court looked, again, to the Convention on the
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, Article 7, and strictly applied
· the twenty-four-mile closing line and semicircle test (the so-called
Boggs Formula) for juridical bays. It also recognized the principle
of straight baselines enunciated and applied by the International
Court of Justice in the Fisheries Case66 as well as Article 7,
paragraph 2, of the above Convention and concluded that, since
there was "too little technical information or consensus among
nations on that and related subjects to allow the formulation of
uniform rules," 67 each nation is "left free to draw straight baselines
along suitable insular configurations if it so desired." 68 Hence the
decision whether or not to invoke this power was entirely in the
hands of the United States. The Court observed:
While we agree that the straight baseline method was designed
for precisely such coasts as the Mississippi River Delta area, we
adhere to the position that the selection of this optional method

63. 381 U.S. at 139.
64. Id. at 175-76. For determining this line the Court followed Article 3 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone which provides that "[e]xcept where
otherwise provided in these articles, the normal baseline for measuring the breadth of the
territorial sea is the low-water line along the coast as marked on large-scale charts officially
recognized by the coastal State." The Court applied this rule as follows: "We interpret the
two lines thus indicated to conform, and on the official United States coastal charts of the
Pacific Coast prepared by the United States Coast and Geodetic Survey, it is the lower
low-water line which is marked." Id. at 176.
65. Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S,C. § 1302(c).
66. Fisheries Case, supra note l, at 116.
67. 394 U.S. at 11.
68. Id. at 70.
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of establishing boundaries should be left to the branches of Government responsible for the formulation and implementation of foreign
policy.69

The Supreme Court also canvassed a third basis for characterizing maritime areas as "inland waters," namely "historic bays." After
pointing out that, although historic bays are acknowledged to exist
in Article 7 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous
Zone, they are not defined in the Convention; but the concept
"therefore derives its content from general principles of
international law." 70 The Court also observed, however, that: "it is
generally agreed that historic title can be claimed only when the
'coastal nation has traditionally asserted and maintained dominion
with the acquiescence of foreign nations' ."11
The Court did not decide whether Louisiana's evidence of
historic waters to which it was entitled was "clear beyond doubt," 12
but remitted that issue to a Special Master. It concluded its holding
on this subject in the following rather oracular and recondite terms:
The only fair way to apply the Convention's recognition of historic
bays to this case, then, is to treat the claim of historic waters as
if it were being made by the national sovereign and opposed by
another nation. To the extent the United States could rely on state
activities in advancing such a claim, they are relevant to the determination of the issue in this case. 73

Subsequently, the Special Master found that:
From the foregoing it is apparent that there is no basis for
Louisiana's claim of historic inland waters extending beyond the
limits of its coastline as determined by Section 2(c) of the Submerged Lands Act as interpreted by Subsections 1 through 5 of
Article 7 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Subsection 6 thereof having no application to the
facts in this case, even though undisputed. All of these facts are
as consistent with a claim of territorial seas which Louisiana was
asserting to the extent of 27 miles from its shore line from 1938
69. Id. at 72-73. The Court relied on U.S. v. California, 381 U.S. at 139, 168. In quoting
this latter decision the Court said: "[t]he choice under the Convention to use the straightbaseline method for determining inland waters claimed against other nations is one that
rests with the Federal Government, and not with the individual States.'' 394 U.S. at 72
(quoting U.S. v. California, 381 U.S. at 168).
70. 394 U.S. at 75 (footnote omitted).
71. 394 U.S. at 23 (quoting U.S. v. California, 381 U.S. at 172 (footnotes omitted)).
72. 394 U.S. at 77 (quoting U.S. v. California, 381 U.S. at 175).
73. 394 U.S. at 77-78.
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to 1953 (Louisiana Act 55 of 1938) and nine miles from its shoreline
from 1954 until the Court's decision of 1960 (Louisiana Act 33 of
1954) as they are with any claim of inland waters. Far from being
clear beyond doubt, the evidence here adduced resembles that
introduced in the California case which was held to be questionable,
and therefore insufficient to support a finding of historic waters
in the face of a contrary declaration by the United States.
3.

United States v. Florida1'

The most substantial claim which Florida made in this case
(apart from the claim to submerged lands extending three leagues,
rather than three sea-miles, under the territorial sea into the Gulf
of Mexico) was that to Florida Bay as internal waters. (The State
defined this feature by means of a closing line between the Dry
Tortugas and Cape Romano, a distance of about one hundred
nautical miles.) It based this claim on an argument in the alternative.
Florida Bay was either a juridical bay or an historic bay.
In the brief decree in this case the Special Master reviewed
his finding that Florida Bay was not an historic bay. This was on
the motion of the State of Florida. On the motion of the United
States, he was ordered to review his finding that a portion of Florida
Bay, namely the part which could be defined by a twenty-fQur mile
closing line, was a juridical bay by virtue of his recommendation
that closing lines be drawn around three groups of islands that make
up the Florida Keys.
Subsequently, on May 24, 1976, the Supreme Court of the
United States, after hearing argument from both the United States
and Florida on the Special Master's Supplemental Report, entered
a decree concluding the issues of both historic and juridical bays
in this case. 75 It stated, inter alia, that:
There is no historic bay on the coast of the State of Florida. There
are no inland waters within Florida Bay, or within the Dry
Tortugas Islands, the Marquesas Keys and the lower Florida Keys
(from Money Key to Key West), the closing lines of which affect
the rights of either the United States or the State of Florida under
this decree. 78

In finding that Florida Bay did not constitute a historic bay
or historic waters, the Special Master, after reviewing the opinions
74. U.S. v. Florida, 420 U.S. 531 (1975).
75. U.S. v. Florida, 425 U.S. 791 (1976).
76. Id. at 793.
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of the Supreme Court in the California and Louisiana cases, concluded that the criteria for establishing the existence of an historic
bay or historic waters were:
(1) There must be an open, notorious and effective exercise
of sovereign authority over the area not merely with respect to
local citizens but as against foreign nationals as well;
(2) This authority must have been exercised for a considerable period of time; and
(3) Foreign states must have acquiesced in the exercise of
this authority as against their nationals. 77

The Special Master was, in part, persuaded by the disclaimer
of the United States that Florida Bay was an historic bay but, in
the light of the Court's reiteration, in the California and Louisiana
cases, that such a disclaimer by the United States might not be
decisive when the state's historic claim was "clear beyond a doubt." 78
He thereupon found that Florida had not met that burden of proof.79
Indeed, he pointed out that it "seems clear from the evidence that ·
the State of Florida has never, before or since 1968, seized a foreign
vessel in the disputed area beyond the three-league limit for
violating its laws." 80
The Special Master's further Report was then appealed to the
Supreme Court which entered a decree 81 upholding that Report in
general. With regard to historic bays the Court found, as has already
been pointed out, that there "is no historic bay on the coast of the
State of Florida." 82

4. United States v. Maine 83
In a brief opinion Justice White, expressing the unanimous
views of the eight justices participating in the case, upheld the
Court's prior doctrine regarding states' claims to historic bays.
While the case had certain unique historical features (it was brought
by the thirteen original states and therefore required an analysis
of eighteenth century English law and policy and of the original
patents granted by the English Crown), these unique features no
more required the Court to distinguish the California, Texas, Loui77. U.S. v. Florida, Report of Albert B. Maris, Special Master, January 18, 1974 (October
Term 1973, No. 52 Original) 41 [hereinafter cited as Report of the Special Master].
78. Id. at 42.
79. Id. at 46.
80. Id. at 45.
81. See U.S. v. Florida, 425 U.S. at 791.
82. Id. at 793.
83. U.S. v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515 (1975).
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siana and Florida cases, which have already been discussed, than
they provided the occasion for any reconsideration of what should
now be regarded as the Supreme Court's established doctrine with
regard to states' claims to historic bays. This is especially
interesting because both Chesapeake and Delaware bays have, since
the early days of the Union, been regarded as historic bays. 84 Be
that as it may, the Court was not disposed to disturb the Special
Master's finding that since these bays were, in effect, less than
twenty-four miles from headland to headland at their entrances,
they were the internal waters of the respective states and that there
was no need to go further with the onerous burden of proof of having to adduce "historical evidence [which is] clear beyond doubt." 85
Although these advantageous geographical characteristics do not
equally apply to the whole of Long Island Sound, and despite the
fact that traditionally this stretch of water has been regarded as
internal waters on the basis of historic title, the Maine case tells
us now that only those parts of the Sound which comply with the
criteria for establishing juridical bays may now be claimed by the
littoral states as internal waters. The Court held itself to be bound
by the earlier cases, not by any doctrine of res judicata, because
the states parties to the present action had not participated in the
earlier ones, but by virtue of stare decisis. Hence the Court's three
criteria 858 and its strict requirement of proof of historic title "beyond
doubt" have become this tribunal's settled doctrine with regard to
disputes over historic titles between states of this Union and the
United States. Later an argument will be presented to the effect
that these holdings, relating as they do to domestic constitutional
law issues, should not necessarily be viewed as binding on the
United States in an international dispute with a foreign countryespecially where this country is seeking to uphold an exclusive claim
on the basis of its historic title.
5.

United States v. Alaska86

Claiming Cook Inlet to be inland waters on the basis of historic
title, the State of Alaska offered, for competitive oil and gas lease
sale, mineral resources in the submerged lands under that arm of
the Pacific Ocean. Cook Inlet is an elongated body of water extending from the ocean for some 150 miles into Alaska. Its opening, front84. See infra notes 113-14 and accompanying text regarding both of these bays.
85. See supra note 72 and the accompanying text.
85a. See supra text accompanying note 77.
86. U.S. v. Alaska, 422 U.S. 184 (1975).
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ing on the open sea, is some 47 miles across from headland to
headland. This offer prompted the United States to seek injunctive relief and to quiet its title over the submerged lands under
the Inlet which it claimed. It should be noted that the upper or inner
portion of the Inlet, namely above the point where a twenty-four
mile closing line effectively joined its opposite sides, was not in
dispute. The United States conceded that above such a line the Inlet
constituted a juridical bay and hence was "inland waters" under
the Submerged Lands Act of 1953. The issue between the state and
the United States was whether the whole of the Inlet should be
recognized as an historic bay.
The Federal District Court for the District of Alaska, where
the United States sued for relief, dismissed the United States' complaint. The court examined the evidence relating to the periods of
Russian sovereignty over Alaska, United States sovereignty when
that area was a federal territory and Alaska's sovereignty after
becoming a state. It found that Alaska had effectively established
that Cook Inlet was an historic bay. The Supreme Court, on the
other hand, by Justice Blackmun for six of the justices to two,
decided that the District Court's assessment of the legal significance
of the facts before it was erroneous. Justices Stewart and Rehnquist
dissented on the ground that both of the courts below had applied
correct legal criteria for establishing the status of Cook Inlet as
an historic bay.
The majority found that the District Court had been clearly
correct in its finding that the United States had exercised jurisdiction over the Lower Cook Inlet during the period of Alaska's
existence as a territory, "for the purpose of fish and wildlife
management." 87 It added that:
It is far from clear, however, that the District Court was correct
in concluding that the fact of enforcement of fish and wildlife
regulations was legally sufficient to demonstrate the type of
authority that must be exercised to establish title to a historic
bay. 88

The majority stressed its view that to establish Cook Inlet as
inland or internal waters by virtue of historic title the state would
have to show that the area had not been one in which foreign ships'
right of innocent passage had been exercised, for that would be
87. Id. at 196.
88. Id. The Court remained unconvinced that fisheries and wildlife management provided that "the historic evidence [is] clear beyond doubt." Id. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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evidence that the area in dispute had been treated as territorial
sea. Hence evidence of merely the enforcement of fishing and
wildlife regulations was "patently insufficient," 89 and what had to
be shown was "historically, an assertion of power to exclude all
foreign vessels and navigation." 90
On the element ·of acquiescence, the District Court had argued
that historic title had been established by the "failure of any foreign
nation to protest." 91 The Supreme Court, in contrast with the
International Court of Justice in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries
Case, decided that "something more than the mere failure to object
must be shown." 92 It added:
The failure of other countries to protest is meaningless unless it
is shown that the government of those countries knew or
reasonably should have known of the authority being asserted. 93

Furthermore, the Court stressed the international dimension
of a claim to historic title, even in a dispute between a state and
the United States. It said:
Alaska clearly claims the waters in question as inland waters, but
the United States neither supported nor disclaimed the State's
position. Given the ambiguity of the Federal Government's position, we cannot agree that the assertion of sovereignty possessed
the clarity essential to a claim of historic title over inland
waters. 9aa

Finally, the Court felt that the evidence was inconclusive
regarding foreign acquiescence. Rather, it pointed to a Japanese
protest against the position taken by Alaska. 98b
D. THE RELIANCE OF THE UNITED STATES CASES FOR THE
CLARIFICATION AND EVOLUTION OF RELEVANT PRINCIPLES
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW-PERSUASION, RECEPTION AND
TRANSFORMATION

The holding in United States v. Louisiana that the setting of
states' boundaries is a domestic matter has already been quoted
89. Id. at 197.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 199-200.
92. Id. at 200.
93. Id. These comments clearly testify to a divergence between the Supreme Court
of the United States and the International Court of Justice's holding in the Fisheries Case,
see supra text accompanying note 23.
93a. Id. at 203.
93b. Id.
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at length. 93c On the other hand, in United States v. California the
Supreme Court announced that it would follow the criteria prescribed by international law, and especially those agreed upon (for
example those regarding straight baselines and juridical bays) in
the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone,
where applicable. 93d In United States v. Louisiana (Louisiana Boundary Case), it observed that while historic bays were not defined
in the convention:
[T]he term ... derives its content from general principles of international law. As the absence of a definition indicates, there is no
universal accord on the exact meaning of historic waters. There
is substantial agreement, however, on the outlines of the doctrine
and on the type of showing which a coastal nation must make in
order to establish a claim to historic inland waters. 94

But, because the Court was reluctant to accept disclaimers of
waters as constituting historic bays by the United States as completely conclusive, as it had with regard to waters within straight
baselines (for example those lying shoreward of "fringes of
islands"95), it did require the state to adduce evidence which is "clear
beyond doubt" before accepting, or guiding a Special Master to
accept, that state's case on historic bays as an accepted concept
of public international law. Secondly, its formulation was contrary
to what has been seen in international law and especially in the
Fisheries Case, of a strict burden of proof incumbent upon the
claimant member state of the Union that it must establish its case
as "clear beyond doubt." This second issue will be deferred to this
paper's discussion, under a separate heading, of "burden of proof."
The former will, however, be taken up in the present context under
the rubric of the function of international law in the process of decision when a federal court exercises its original jurisdiction to resolve
disputes between member states of the federation, and questions
the persuasiveness of those domestic court decisions before international tribunals.
1.

International Law in Domestic Tribunals

The classical generalization, for both American and Commonwealth common law jurisdictions, on the relationship of inter93c. Supra note 45 and accompanying text.
93d. 381 u.s. 139, 163-65 (1965).
94. 394 U.S. at 75 (footnotes omitted).
95. Id. at 75. See also U.S. v. Alaska, 422 U.S. 184, 203 (1975).
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national and domestic law, remains Lord Mansfield's declaration
in Triquet v. Bath that: "the law of nations, in its full extent, [is]
part of the [common] law." 96 But this should not be misunderstood.
International law binds the state in its international relations while
municipal law operates within the state. Hence a binding rule of
municipal law does not operate internationally: nor does a rule of
international law di'rectly create obligations among private
individuals. But certain rules of international law call upon states
to legislate (to "receive" into their domestic system) domestic law
rules reflecting or implementing those international law obligations
or rules. Failure to do so would constitute a breach of the state's
international obligations. The international law rule which is so
received, however, is transformed into a domestic law rule by the
act of reception. Anzilotti tells us that:
D'autre part, etant donnee la separation des orres juridiques, toute
reception est un act d'etablissement de normes. La reception, de
plus, implique necessairement une transformation, des normes
rec;ues, qui va au dela de la pure valeur formelle. Avant tout, toute
norme s'addresse aux sujects de l'ordre juridique dans lequel elle
est en vigueur; et puisque le qualite de sujet juridique est une
correlation entre une entite et les normes qui composent un ordre
juridique donne, ainsi le seul fait qu'une norme est reu dans un
ordre juridique, implique que cette norme vaur pour des sujets
differents de ceux pous lesquels elle valait dane l'ordre interier .
. . . Une transformation, non seulement formelle, mais meme
substantielle, est done include dans le concept meme de reception;
c'est pour quoi il ne semple pas exact deduire l'impossibilite de
la reception du degre de transformation qui est necessaire dans
les normes ayant fait l'objet d'une reception. 97

International law only operates in the arena of international
obligations: municipal law only operates in the arena of municipal
law obligations. Thus, Lord Mansfield's maxim should be understood
to mean that, for settling disputes in municipal law, such as domestic
disputes between private parties, the rule establishing relevant
international obligations becomes, for the purposes of international
decision, transformed into norms of municipal law. International
law may thus, in relevant cases, provide the materials out of which
the municipal rule of decision is fashioned. Such transformation,
96. Triquet v. Bath, 97 Eng. Rep. 936, 937-38, 3 Burr. 1478, 1481 (K.B. 1764) (quoting
Lord Talbot in Barbuit's Case, 25 Eng. Rep. 777, T. Talb. 281 (K.B. 1735)).
97. ANZILOTTI. 1 COURS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 62-63 (Gidel Trans. 1929). Note: the
above quotation is at page 59 of the third edition (1927) (Italian) [hereinafter cited as
ANZILOTTI).

Published by SURFACE, 1984

35

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 11, No. 2 [1984], Art. 3

Syr. J. lnt'l L. & Com.

246

[Vol. 11:211

in addition, saves the state from being in breach of its international
obligations.
Even when the Supreme Court of the United States, or
similarly placed courts in other federations, exercises original
jurisdiction (or its equivalent) in disputes between states, or
between one or more states and a federal authority, the court does
not sit as an international tribunal, but as a domestic one. Hence
the following remark by Dr. James Brown Scott is not accepted
as far as that writer's belief in the Court's international character
is concerned: "The Supreme Court [of the United States] is one of
limited jurisdiction and as an International Court is also one of
limited jurisdiction and is likely to be so indefinitely ...." 98
Of similar import, of course, was Justice Field's statement,
which is also not accepted in Iowa v. Illinois, that the "rules of
international law will be held to obtain, unless changed by statute
or usage." 99 In such remarks as these decisions of the United States
Supreme Court in conflicts between States of the Union are seen
simply as applications of international law. 100 Of course, in such cases
the Court has received and applied principles of international law
as indeed did the Federal High Court of Germany under the Weimar
Republic 101 and as does the Swiss Federal Tribunal. 102 But the decisions rendered in such cases are still municipal decisions, settling
municipal issues under international municipal law. The late Professor Josef L. Kunz labeled such decisions as these as falling under
"international law by analogy" and distinguished this category from
"genuine international law" and explained his thesis as follows:
The application of international law norms in these interstate cases
is neither a duty imposed by international law, nor has it anything
to do with the municipal "part of the law of the land" rule which
envisages only genuine international law. It is purely a matter of
municipal law to apply in such cases international law by analogy. 103

98. Scott, The Role of the SuperM Court of the Unit,ed Staies in the Settlement ofImerstat,e
Dis]YUtes, 3 SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LA w 1540, 1546 (1938).
99. Iowa v. Illinois, 147 U.S. l, 10 (1892).
100. See, e.g., H.A. SMITH. THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT AS AN INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
NATIONAL COURTS (1968).
101. See, e.g., Wurtemberg and Prussia v. Bader (The Donauversinkung Case), Ann. Dig.
128 (Case No. 86) (Germany, Staatsgerichtshof 1927).
102. See, e.g., Argona v. Solure, (Federal Court of Switzerland), cited in Trial Smelter
Case (U.S. v. Canada) 3 R. lnt'l Arb. Awards 1905 (1949).
103. Kunz, International Law by Analogy, 45 AM. J. INT'L L. 329, 334 (1951).
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2. Domestic Law in International Tribunals

In Article IV of the compromise of the Trail Smelter Arbitration the Parties agreed that "The Tribunal shall apply the law and
practice followed in dealing with cognate questions in the United
States of America as well as international law and practice ...." 10'
The arbitration clauses of the Treaty of Berlin of 1925 (the
Peace Treaty signed between Germany and the United States)105
contained a clause providing that the Tribunal could apply, in the
settlement of disputes, principles of law common to the legal
systems of both Parties. Finally, Article 38.1.c. of the Statute of
the International Court of Justice (and of the Court's predecessor,
the Permanent Court of International Justice) extends the list of
applicable law to "the general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations." 108 These principles were conceived of as a third
category independent of treaty and custom and intended "to push
to the last limit ... the productivity of [the Court's] sources." 107 As
Professor Julius Stone tells us, this source of materials refers to
common principles analogous to the Old Roman jus gentium, the

104. Trail Smelter Case, supra note 102, at 1907.
105. Treaty between the Untied States and Germany of Friendship, Commerce and
Consular Rights, done Dec. 8, 1923, 44 Stat. 2132, T.S. No. 725, 8 Bevans 153 (effective Feb.
10, 1925).
106. While this category was innovative and creative its formulation has not been
without criticism. Representatives of the Group of 77 have expressed resentment at the
choice of the qualifier of the nations whose legal systems provide the materials of legal decision as "civilized." They tend to see an exclusion of the newly decolonized countries in this
legal creativity. In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (W. Ger. v. Den.; W. Ger. v. Neth.)
1969 I.C.J. 4 (Judgment of Feb. 20), for example, Judge Ammoun expressed the view that
"the term 'civilized nations' is incompatible with the relevant provisions of the United Nations
Charter, and the consequence thereof is an ill-advised limitation of the notion of the general
principles of law." Id. at 132. He explained this incompatibility by pointing out that:
Thus it is that certain nations, to whose legal systems allusion was made above,
which did not form part of the limited concert of states which did the law-making,
up to the first decades of the 20th century, for the whole of the international community, today participate in the determination or elaboration of the general principles of law, contrary to what is improperly stated by Article 38, paragraph l(c)
of the Court's Statute.
Id. at 34-35.
Judge Ammoun considered any of the following formulations to be preferable:
(a) The "universally recognized principles of law" (Root); id.
(b) The "general principles of law recognized by ... [the] nations" (a voluntary omission of the offending adjective); id. at 135.
(c) The "general principles of law recognized in national legal systems" (Waldock); id.
(d) The "general principles of law." Id.
107. ANZILOTTI, supra note 97, at 117.
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highest common factor in national legal systems. 108
It is clearly arguable that the five tidelands litigations between
the United States and certain states of the Union raising historic
bay issues in connection with the delimitation of their respective
shares of the national continental shelf relate to the interpretation
of a municipal statute, and that the Supreme Court's resort to
international law is a clear example of transformation in the sense
that Professor Anzilotti presented that function. International law
was simply used as providing an interpretative tool for the elucidation of a domestic statute and of the intent of Congress in drafting it.
Do the five United States continental shelf cases which deal
with the issue of historic bays then have utility for formulating law
solutions in delimitation problems, if they cannot be brought within
the broad and generous scope of "general principles of law?" It is
agreed that the utility of those cases is that of offering persuasive
precedents under Article 38, paragraph 1 (d) of the Court's Statute.
In particular, as later paragraphs will show, they provide useful
starting points for analysis of such questions as burden of proof,
the type of authority assured to the coastal state (the quantum of
the interest if you will) and the residual nature of the historic bays
concept.
VII: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF RIGHTS
A.

ACTS NECESSARY TO CONSOLIDATE HISTORIC
TITLE: EFFECTIVENESS

One theme running through the decisions of the Supreme Court
of the United States in the California, Texas, Louisiana, Florida
and Maine cases relating to the establishment of historic title over
coastal waters so that the claimant states became entitled to regard
those waters as parts of their territory, consisted of the requirement of the continuous and open exercise of authority; authority
acceded to, moreover, by other (foreign sovereign) states. The states
asserting such a claim to an historic title must unequivocally exercise an authority which is exclusively referable, not to some lesser
claim, such as the regulation of fisheries and game, but to its plenary
and sovereign power. On the other hand, the requirement of the
open, unequivocal and continuous exercise of authority is,
necessarily, a relative notion. For example, in the case of Direct

c.

108. See STONE. LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 137 (1954). See also
DE
VISSCHER. THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 400-03 (Corbett trans. 1968)
[hereinafter cited as DE VISSCHER].
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U.S. Cable Co. v. Anglo-American Cable Co., 109 the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council found Conception Bay, a very large bay
indeed off the coast of Newfoundland, to be an historic bay. Unlike
the United States Supreme Court in the California, Texas, Louisiana, Florida and Maine cases which have just been discussed, the
Judicial Committee was satisfied that the continued control of the
fishery of the Bay, in the Bay, effectively constituted the relevant
acts of sovereignty. An act of the British Parliament in closing the
Bay to foreign fishermen together with the regulations and statutes
enacted by the Newfoundland Parliament administering fishing in
the Bay as a colonial Parliament implementing and adapting the
British statute, were enough to establish the rule that an American
company, the Direct Cable Company, was not entitled to lay a cable
in Conception Bay. Interestingly, we can note that the acts of
sovereignty leading to the establishment of the status of Conception Bay in Direct U.S. Cable Co. v. Anglo-American Cable Co. were
all related to fisheries in the water column of the bay, yet the activity to be controlled was a sea-bottom activity- the laying of
cables. One ground for distinguishing this case from the five decided
by the Supreme Court of the United States on historic bays lies
in the relativity of the time and place to the continuity and frequency of acts of sovereignty providing the basis of the claim. These
questions will be determined by the degree of use and the kind of
use relative to the location, accessibility, terrain and amenability
to sovereign control by the claimant state in relation to the uses
by other states adverse to the coastal state's claim. The Bay of Cancale again provides an example. Although this bay was the subject
of a dispute, that dispute was not settled by judicial proceedings,
but by an Anglo-French treaty. But the activities which were agreed
as establishing special French rights there were those of the French
government's continued and consistent regulation of an oyster
fishery (as well as other forms of fishing). In contrast with the
holding of the United States Supreme Court in the Louisiana and
Florida cases, generally speaking sedentary fisheries, where the
produce is itself cultivated on the sea bottom and is stationary there,
appositely lend themselves to the idea of a sovereign activity consolidating title over a specific area. The vocational and economic
activities of the fishermen providing the oysters with their beds
do not provide the basis for this argument; but the regulation by
the state of those fishermen, and the protection of the health of
109. Direct U.S. Cable Co. v. Anglo-American Cable Co., 2 App. Cas. 394 (P.C. 1877i.
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consumers by regulating the density of the fishery and the purity
of the water and by avoiding disease amongst the fish, and so forth,
especially when the state's regulation of the fishery included the
letting of oyster-bed leases, do offer sound bases for arguments on
behalf of historic titles to bays. Interestingly enough, away on the
other side of the world, Antipodean to the Bay of Cancale, there
is another historic bay. It lies· off the western coast of Australia.
Shark Bay is a large bay of some seventy miles in length and fortysix miles wide at the mouth and for the most part, very shallow .110
This bay has long been claimed by Australia as an historic bay. In
the early times of the European settlement extensive pearl fisheries
were established there. The regulation of the fishery was predicated
upon the idea, so as to prevent quarrels amongst the pearl
fishermen, that the colonial government of Western Australia and
later the state government, should lease sea-bed areas both within
and without what would normally be the territorial sea, to
fishermen, giving to each of those fishermen exclusive use and control of the tract of oyster bed leased to him (a somewhat similar
system is followed in parts of Chesapeake Bay). This Western
Australian example, I suggest, illustrates unequivocally what is
meant by an exercise of sovereignty. The whole area is administered
and controlled, and there is unequivocal compliance with the legislation and the clauses of the leases issued by the government. Furthermore, no foreign state, or ships wearing foreign flags, have fished there. The exercise of police power in ensuring that the leases
are complied with provides testimony that there is a clear exercise of territorial sovereignty by the very fact that the state is
prepared to give leases of the soil of the sea-bed within the whole
extent of the bay for the purpose of ensuring the peaceable exploitation of its bounty. Of course, other bays have been viewed as historic
without such an intensely territorial and detailed exercise of
sovereign control as illustrated in the Direct U.S. Cable Co. v. AngloA merican Cable Co. case.
110. Historic Bays claimed by Australia (since earliest times of settlement) would appear,
from a letter from the Secretary of the Navy Office, Melbourne to Professor Charteris of
Sydney University Law School, dated April 26, 1936 (copy held in author's files), to be:

1.
2.
3.
4.

Van Dieman's Gulf
Exmouth Gulf
Shark Bay
Moreton Bay
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34.4
26

95.5
42.4

46
8.7

70.4

8.7
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An interesting question now arises regarding the status of
Delaware and Chesapeake Bays iil light of the holding of the United
States Supreme Court in the Maine case. It should be pointed out
that the twenty-four mile closing line for "juridical bays" is of
relatively recent origin- international consensus only being finally
formalized at the 1958 United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea. Accordingly one may ask whether, after the general reception of the twenty-four mile closing line, the question is still relevant regarding these two bays, no matter what may have been the
concept's importance to them prior to the reception of the modern
concept of juridical bays. In addition, the characterization of the
United States' title to these bays as based on historic grounds may
still be of importance independently of their contemporary status
as juridical bays. Waters seaward of the twenty-four mile closing
line may be recognized as internal waters of the coastal state under
international law, as distinct from domestic law, if title can be shown
to be predicated on historic grounds. Be that as it may, there seems
to be ample evidence of historic title over these bays which,
however, may lapse if permitted to fall into desuetude.
The status of Chesapeake Bay, which had been originally within
the lands which King James I granted to the Virginia Company in
1609, was finally settled by the Second Court of Commissioners of
the Alabama claims in the case of Stetson v. United States which
asserted that "[w]e are forced to the conclusion that Chesapeake
Bay must be held to be wholly within the territorial jurisdiction and
authority of the United States and no part of the high seas ...." 111
Prior to the American Revolution, Delaware Bay, like
Chesapeake Bay, was considered by the British Crown to be part
of its territories in North America and was transferred, in the 1783
Treaty of Paris, to the newly created republics constituting the
United States. Then, ten years later and during Britain's wars with
revolutionary France, the French frigate L 'Embuscade took a British
ship, the Grange, as prize more than three miles off-shore, but within
a line joining Cape May and Cape Henlopen.
On May 14, 1793 the then Attorney-General of the United
States declared that the Grange had been seized within the neutral
territory of the United States. France released the captured ship,
thereby recognizing the neutral status of the waters where she had
111. MOORE. 4 INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS 4333, 4341, (1898). See MOORE, 1 DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 742 (1906).
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been taken and, since Great Britain had accepted the return of the
vessel, she, too, recognized the neutrality of the bay and hence its
status as a bay subject to the coastal state's sovereignty over its
full extent. 112 The United States' historic title has not been
challenged since then. Indeed, it was promptly acquiesced in by the
two maritime nations with the greatest interest in the bay's status,
and thus, provides a clear example of the manner in which effective control ripened into an unchallenged historic title.
Just as the types of controlling acts which justify sovereignty
and control are relative to and dependent on the terrain, the
intensity of use and the degree of accessibility of the territory
claimed are crucial. So, too, is the frequency or continuity of
sovereign activities over a bay claimed by means of an historic title.
To achieve effectiveness these are, similarly, relative and dependent on the factors of location, ease of control and the types of
sovereign acts, as well as the world community's interest in resisting
its status as an enclosed bay. Here Dr. Huber's arbitration (not
relating to the consolidation of an historic title over a sea area, but
over an island) in the Island of Palmas (Miangas) Case, 113 conflicts
with the Judgement of the Permanent International Court of Justice
in the Eastern Greenland Case 11 ' and finally the Mexican/French
arbitration with regard to the status of Clipperton Island. 115 This
last decision took the relativity doctrine almost to its ultimate
limit- the dependence of the sovereign acts on the accessibility of
territory was taken to mean that when the territory is almost completely inaccessible and the world community's interest in its
political fate minimal, the requisite sovereign acts are reduced to
just above a nullity, yet they may be treated as sufficient to
establish title.
B.

THE CRITICAL DATE 116

In international law the point of time falling at the end of a
period within which the material facts of a claim are said to have
112. MOORE. 1 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 735-39 (1906); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 32 (1793).
113. Island of Palmas Case (U.S. v. Neth.), Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) 83 (Perm. Ct. Arb.1928).
114. Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.l.J., ser. A/B, No. 53,
at 3 (Judgment of Apr. 5).
115. Clipperton Island Case (France v. Mexico) 2 R. lnt'l Arb. Awards 1105 (1949);
Arbitral Award on the Subject of the Difference Relative to the Sovereignty Over Clipperton Island, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 390 (1932). See Dickinson, The Clipperton Island Case, 27 AM. J.
INT'L L. 130 (1933).
116. For a fuller presentation of this theme see Goldie, The Critical Date, 12 INT L &
COMP. L.Q. 1251 (1963) [hereinclfter cited as Goldie, The Critical Date].
0
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occurred is usually called the "critical date." It is also the date after
which the actions of the parties to a dispute can no longer affect
the issue. 117 It is exclusionary, and it is terminal. Hence it is most
frequently resorted to in cases of historic title to indicate the period
within which a party should be able to show the crystallization of
its title or its fulfillment of the requirement of the doctrine of acquisitive prescription or consolidation. Elsewhere 118 this writer has
discussed, as examples of the uses of the critical date for the purpose of establishing a consolidation of historic title, the establishment of a limited Norwegian sovereignty over Spitzbergen 119 under
the Treaty of Paris of 1920, 120 the Minquiers and Ecrehos Case, 121
the Island of Palmas Case,1 22 the Legal Status of Eastern Greenland
Case, 123 the Right of Passage Case 12' and the Fisheries Case. 125 In all
these cases the critical date was an essential element indicating
the point of time from which the Court was satisfied that the rights
in question had crystallized. They were shown to have depended
on the point of time of the convergence of distinct sets of facts of
concatenations of events which characterizes or defines the issues
between the claimant states and their opponents. This is the point
of the common juristic definition of the dispute-the point at which
117. Johnson, supra note 24, at 324 n.4. See Sir Lionel Heald's submission to a similar
effect before the International Court of Justice in Minquiers and Ecrehos (U.K. v. Nor.),
1953 I.C.J. Pleadings 2, 48-61 (Oral Argument of Sir Lionel Heald) (Judgment of Nov. 17).
118. Goldie, The Critical Date, supra note 116, at 1256-57.
119. Id. at 1252-64.
120. Treaty between the United States and Other Powers Relating to the Spitsbergen
Archipelago, done Feb. 9, 1920, 43 Stat. 1892, T.S. No. 686, 2 Bevans 269 (effective Feb. 18,
1924). The nine signatory states were Denmark, France, Great Britain, Holland, Italy, Japan,
Norway, Sweden, and the United States of America. Norway's sovereignty was recognized
over Bear Island and of the resort to this archipelago by the nationals of many European
countries from the late middle of the seventeenth century to the 1920 Agreement, see Scott,
Arctic Exploration and International Law, 3 AM. J. INT'L L. 928, 930, 937 (1909); Lansing, A
Unique International Problem, 11 AM. J. INT'L L. 763 (1971); FULTON, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE
SEA 112, 104, 181, 182-83, 193, 194, 198-200, 527 (1911). For a brief outline of the 1920 Treaty
see Nielsen, The Solution of the Spitzbergen Question, 14 AM. J. INT'L L. 232 (1920). Soviet
Russia protested against the 1920 Treaty in 1923, see 8 BULLETIN DE L'INSTITUT INTERMEDAIRE
INTERNATIONAL 311 (1923), as she had not been consulted. In 1924, however, the Soviets
informed the Norwegian government that they would recognize Norwegian sovereignty over
Spitzbergen. Letter from the Norwegian Minister (Bryn) to the Secretary of State, March
20, 1924, [1924] 1 FOREIGN REL. U.S. at 1 (1939 ed.).
121. Minquiers and Ecrehos, supra note 117, at 47.
122. Island of Palmas Case, supra note 113.
123. Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, supra note 114.
124. Case Concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), 1960 I.C.J.
6 (Judgment of Apr. 12).
125. Fisheries Case, supra note 1, at 6.
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"the issues are joined." For before a dispute can be the subject of
adjudication, the separately characterized right-creating facts in the
dispute must be brought to a common ground: their convergence
must necessarily be effectuated. The critical date arises when questions of time form a necessary element in the point of convergence.
This concept of a critical date may be illustrated by disputes
over territory. In such cases a series of acts creating no more than
an inchoate title 126 (each of which in itself not being sufficient to
establish the claimant's title) may be seen to converge with, for
example, acts of recognition by other states. The establishment of
Norway's sovereignty over Spitzbergen illustrates this point. After
several centuries, during which her sovereignty re~ained inchoate
and disputed, Norway gained a perfected title by virtue of its
recognition by the Powers in the Treaty of 1920 signed at Paris.
Norway's acts, never sufficient in themselves to perfect her title,
but capable of keeping her claim alive, converged with the general
recognition in 1920 to create a complete sovereignty which came
to be recognized by the third states. On the other hand, in 1923
the Soviet Union protested against the perfection of Norway's title
by the general recognition at a conference in which she did not
participate. 121 But in 1928 she recognized Norway's sovereignty in
a separate agreement. 128 A situation may be brought into focus, and
a critical date result, from convergence through a peace treaty, the
demarcation of a frontier, a general agreement of recognition, or
a guarantee of frontiers, with the unilateral acts of the claimant
state which had, previously, been sufficient only to establish an
inchoate title, or to assert a provisional or tentative claim. This
example illustrates the convergence of facts and their crystallization into a legal relation. The converging facts form the elements
of legal relation, and their convergence firmly establishes that legal
relation in the place of a situation which would otherwise have
remained inchoate and unripe for settlement.
The critical date is more, it should be stressed 129 than a procedural rule for the exclusion of evidence and more than a rule
126. For a discussion of the concept of "inchoate title" in international law see HALL.
INTERNATIONAL LAW 127-28 (P. Higgins ed. 8th ed. 1924); OPPF,NHF.TM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW
558-59 (Lauterpacht ed. 8th ed. 1955).
127. See Soviet Protest, supra note 120, at 341.
128. Treaty between the United States and Other Powers Relating to Spitzbergen
Archipelago, supra note 120.
129. See Goldie, The Critical Date, supra note 116, at 1257-64.
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whereby the tribunal's jurisdiction may be successfully objected
to. It is a substantive r.ule setting a term to the span of time during which, in a given case, right-creating facts can be availed of
in order to perfect a title. This aspect of the doctrine is connected
with Professor de Visscher's concept of "consolidation by historic
title." 130 This was brought out in the Fisheries Case, 131 especially
where the International Court of Justice said:
From the standpoint of international law, it is now necessary
to consider whether the application of the Norwegian system encountered any opposition from foreign States.
Norway has been in a position to argue without any contradiction
that neither the promulgation of her delimitation Decrees in 1869
and in 1889 nor their application gave rise to any opposition on
the part of foreign States. Since, moreover, these Decrees constitute, as has been shown above, the application of a well-defined
and uniform system, it is indeed the system itself which would reap
the benefit of general toleration, the basis of an historical consolidation which would make it enforceable as against all States.
The notoriety of the facts, the general toleration of the international community, Great Britain's position in the North Sea, her
own interest in the question, and her prolonged abstention would
in any case warrant Norway's enforcement of her system against
the United Kingdom. 182

As Professor D.H.N. Johnson has pointed out, this concept of
consolidation may be used to show a good root of title to territory. 133
It is submitted, however, that before it can become an effective
means of showing a good root of title it requires further development and specificity in application. So far it seems capable, as the
example of the Fisheries Case shows, of doing no more than providing an apparent post hoc justification to a decision which might
otherwise be exceptionable. How may a state utilize the doctrine
to justify a claim, or to defend an exercise of jurisdiction? Unless
there is some means, either qualitatively or quantitatively, of setting
a term to the period of consolidation, it remains a broken reed to
those who would put their trust in it, for until it has crystallized130.
131.
132.
133.

supra note 108, at 200-01, 215, 217.
Fisheries Case, supra note 1, at 116.
Id. at 138-39.
Johnson, Consolidation as a Root of Title in lnU3rnational Law, supra note 24, at 215.

DE VISSCHER,
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become consolidated-it must lack certainty and specificity of
application. This weakness arises from the fact that neither the
International Court of Justice, nor Professors de Visscher and
Johnson have proposed any means of indicating when a given
historic title may be said to have become consolidated.
On the other hand, the uses to which Judge Basdevant and Sir
Percy Spender put the critical date doctrine in the Minquiers and
Ecrehos and Rights of Passage cases respectively demonstrate the
utility of that doctrine in giving a hard cutting edge to the consolidation of historic titles. The convergence of separate activities,.
which is inherent in the notion of the critical date as discussed in
the preceding paragraphs, provides the means of determining the
period over which the claimant may be said to have consolidated
its sovereignty, or failed in the enterprise. The argument here is
that since general international law sets no fixed period for the consolidation or perfection of titles, the relevant aspect of the critical
date doctrine, namely the convergence of disparate elements, provides a functional terminating point to a period over which a state
may consolidate or perfect its title to a disputed territory or to a
right similar to an easement or servitude. It does not follow from
this, however, that the decision of whether a good root of title has
come into being lies in the Court's discretion. The critical date doctrine comes into operation when a catalytic event which, converging as it were with a series of acts constituting a state's inchoate
relation to a territory, crystallizes that relation and presents it for
a decision as to whether the acts in question have consolidated the
title claimed, or have failed.
Examples of this convergence, operating with a catalytic effect
to terminate a period of indeterminate activity, either in favor of
the claimant, or against it, may be found in each of the cases
discussed in the foregoing paragraphs. Thus the Treaty of Paris
of 1898 operated to terminate any possible inchoate claims that
Spain, or her successor in title, may have had in the Palmas Island
Case and which were derivable from the discoveriesin the sixteenth
century. Similarly, because the Norwegian Proclamation of
sovereignty over Eastern Greenland was effective to give a fixed
and certain definition to the issues of the dispute between Denmark
and Norway, and crystallize the formulae of each of the parties'
claims in th.e Status of Eastern Greenland Case, that Proclamation's
date, July 10, 1931, provided the critical date of the dispute. Again
Judge Basdevant's opinion in the Minquiers and Ecrehos Case
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol11/iss2/3
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illustrates this point. There the Treaty of Bretigny, it is suggested,
had the effect of settling the partition of Normandy between
England and France and so provided the critical date. Finally, the
Treaty of 1878 crystallized the relations of the sovereigns of India
and Goa respectively in the Rights of Passage Case. In reconciliation, on the level of legal principles, of the majority's decision and
Sir Percy Spender's dissent, it is submitted that once the view of
the critical date proposed in this paper is accepted, the difference
between the majority and Sir Percy Spender becomes limited to
the factual issue of whether the Treaty merely reflected no more
than a practice of accommodation on the part of the sovereign of
the neighboring territories or whether it granted rights capable
of becoming vested.
In conclusion it should be observed that, in its substantive,
right-creating, aspect the critical date doctrine provides a point of
time as the touchstone for qualifying or selecting the operative facts,
and hence for characterizing appropriate cases. In this way the doctrine effectively brings the whole legal relation into focus. Once
determined upon or manifest, the critical date sets limits to the
period within which the definitive facts can be seen as having taken
place. This in turn leads to the casting of the issues of the dispute
into a concrete form-for example, the perfection of titles to territory, or the espousal of a claim, or the characterization of transactions affected by the emergence of new rights of sovereignty or
dominion.

VIII. BURDEN OF PROOF

A. A VIEW FROM THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT
The United Nations Secretariat, in its study for the International Law Commission, Juridical Regimes of Historic Waters
Including Historic Bays 1:u stated:
The task of the parties to a dispute [over historic waters]
seems less to establish certain facts than to persuade the judges
to follow their respective opinions regarding the evaluation of the
facts. Still, the question of the burden of proof cannot be ignored,
in particular since it is one of the problems usually raised in connection with the right to "historic waters." 135

134. Juridical Regimes of Historic Waters Including Historic Bays, supra note 15.
135. Id. at 21.
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The paper, however, then asserts that:
Each of the opponents therefore bears the burden of proof
with respect to the facts on which they rely. Obviously, this
involves an evaluation not only of the evidence presented regarding the facts but also of the importance of these facts as signs of
the alleged exercise of sovereignty .138

It concludes its substantive statement on the matter with the
observation that:
In summarizing this discussion of the problem of the burden
of proof, it may be said that the general statement that the burden
of proof is on the State claiming historic title to a maritime area
is not of much value. 137

The idea that the burden of proof, as distinct from the burden
of persuasion, shifts from the first party (claimant) whose duty it
was to prove its case to the other party if he wishes to win, of
answering, is surely contrary to what we are taught by the cases.
There is a confusion here between the legal obligation of the burden
of proof with the advocate's factual and contingent task of carrying the burden of convincing the court that the burden of proof has
or has not been discharged, or that the facts adduced have either
been discredited or answered or, in terms of "confession and
avoidance," although the claimant has successfully discharged its
burden of proof, the opposing party has adduced its own independent affirmative facts negating the effect of the claimant's discharge
of its burden of proof. Of these latter facts raised defensively the
party that raises them (the opposing party) must prove them. But
such an act of answering or discrediting the original case is surely
not discharging a sort of countervailing "burden of proof." It is
merely successfully performing the advocate's task of persuasion.
Only when the opponent raises independent facts does he carry the
burden of proof on the basis of the old maxim "he who alleges must
prove," for the rest he carries the "burden of persuasion." This
burden, rather than that of proof, shifts as the case develops.
B. THE SUPREME COURT'S DOCTRINE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

The doctrine of the Supreme Court of the United States has
already been outlined in this paper and an argument has been
136. Id. at 22.
137. Id. at 22-23.

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol11/iss2/3

48

Goldie: Historic Bays in International Law

1984]

Historic Bays in International Law

259

presented for evaluating its utility in the international arena. First,
the Supreme Court established specific requirements for the purpose of settling, in terms of domestic United States federal law,
disputes between the United States and the several states over the
interpretation of the Submerged Lands Act. These requirements
were threefold, namely:
(1) There must be an open, notorious and effective exercise
of sovereign authority over the area not merely with respect to
local citizens but as against foreign nationals as well;
(2) This authority must have been exercised for a considerable period of time; and
(3) Foreign states must have acquiesced in the exercise of
this authority as against their nationals. 138

As has already been pointed out, these United States domestic
law requirements are much more stringent than those laid down
in the Fisheries Case where the International Court of Justice was
satisfied that Norway could establish her claim to have consolidated
historic title to the waters lying beyond her territorial sea measured
by traditional methods, through merely carrying a far lighter burden
of proof and far fewer requirements. The International Court of
Justice stressed Norway's domestic actions and interests while the
Supreme Court of the United States rigorously looked for confirmation of the consolidated reality of the right through its affirmation
by control of foreign citizens and acquiescence by foreign states.
Nor was the Norwegian case established by facts which were "clear
beyond a doubt." 139 Rather, the International Court of Justice
accepted evidence that was not conclusive and interpreted
ambiguities, not in favor of the party seeking to vindicate the world
community's freedom of the high seas, but in support of the state
seeking to establish an encroachment. 1'° For example, Waldock tells
us:
The principal argument of the United Kingdom was that, even if
the 1869 and 1889 Decrees did apply a definite system in
Norwegian law, it was unreasonable to fix other states with
knowledge of the acquiescence in a system which only lay concealed
in these two minor decrees covering small sections of the coast. 1' 1
138. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
140. See Waldock, The Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, 8 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.114, 117-24,
152-66 (1951).
141. Id. at 163. Waldock pointed out
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That the Supreme Court of the United States has imposed, on
states of the United States which seek to appropriate submerged
lands beyond the statutory margin measured from the low water
mark, a more onerous burden of persuasion than that required of
Norway by the International Court of Justice in the Fisheries Case,
may or may not provide a persuasive doctrine for international
tribunals. It may be well to point out, however, that the Supreme
Court was guided by the claims of all states, coastal and landlocked,
of the Union for the vindication of the community interest of all
as represented by the United States, as well as by the special rights
of the coastal states which were vouchsafed to them under the
Submerged Lands Act. Such decisions as the Fisheries Case may,
from this perspective, appear to treat the world community
interests rather more cavalierly than did the Supreme Court of the
United States treat the community interests of the Union. But while
this issue of the different policy perspectives of the different Courts
may be of significance, it must be recalled that the systems are
juridically, as they may also be perceived as politically, distinct and
independent. But surely their shared values may call for a degree
of mutual relevance- each within their own spheres?

IX. THE RIGHTS OF THE COASTAL STATE
Generally speaking, writers and publicists, as well as a majority
of the arbitrations and World Court decisions on the subject, classify
historic waters and historic bays as internal waters-that is, waters
subject to the same degree of state authority as the state's land .
territory and inland lakes, so that the state's territorial sea is
measured from baselines constituting the outer limits of the historic
waters or bays. This characterization of the waters of historic bays
is also reflected in the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and
Contiguous Zone 142 by reading together Articles 5(1) and 7(6) of the
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 143 the same
principle is carried through unchanged into this a test treaty on
[t]he superiority of a system so largely subjective and so dependent on loyaute
et moderation over the essentially objective, geographical system [as, for example, that advocated by the Untied Kingdom] hardly seems obvious in a world of
sovereign states less than half of which have subjected themselves to the risk of
having their loyaute et moderation investigated by the International Court.
Id. at 170.
142. 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 10.
143. 1982 Convention, supra note 13, arts. 5(1) & 7(6).
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the law of the sea. Within such internal waters no right of innocent passage exists for the benefit of foreign flag shipping. Foreign
flag shipping may not even transit harmlessly through the waters
of historic bays without the leave and license of the coastal state.
Indeed, it is the existence of this right through the coastal state's
territorial sea which distinguishes this category of maritime zones
from internal waters.
The United Nations Secretariat's study of the Juridical Regimes
ofHistoric Waters, Including Historic Bays 144 which has already been
critically adverted to, asserts that historic bays may, depending
on their individual histories, belong to one of these two categories.
It states:
On the other hand, it should be recalled that the right to
uhistoric bays" is based on the effective exercise of sovereignty
over the area claimed, together with the general toleration of
foreign States. The sovereignty exercised can either be
sovereignty as over internal waters or sovereignty as over the territorial sea. In principle, the scope of the historic title emerging
should not be wider in scope than the scope of the sovereignty
actually exercised. If the claimant State exercised sovereignty as
over internal waters, the area claimed would be internal waters,
and if the sovereignty exercised was sovereignty as over the territorial sea, the area would be territorial sea. 1' 5

This writer is doubtful of the validity of this proposition. It
does have a certain superficial attractiveness. On the other hand,
when the International Court of Justice was called upon to determine the status of waters over which ships of many nations had
transited it found, in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, that,
without exception, all the waters lying behind baselines connecting
the outermost skerries and rocks of the Norwegian rock rampart
to be internal waters. But there are at least two channels within
the skerrygard which are highways of international navigation, one
is the West Fjord leading to Narvik and allowing passage both south
and north to the Lofoten Islands, and the Indrelea (a channel which
permits through passage at its north and south ends). Transit
parallel to the coast is thus possible. The channel has been used
by ships navigating to and from the Norwegian port of Transholm.
144. Juridical Regimes of Historic Waters Including Historic Bays, supra note 15.
145. Id. at 23.
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So we have both these passages (West Fjord and the Indrelea) as
examples of what had been treated as subjects to rights of innocent passage by the world community, and yet have been allowed
by the International Court of Justice to be imprinted, after its judgment at least, with the status of internal waters. Back in 1868, the
Norwegian authorities arrested a fishing boat Les Quatres Freres
in the West Fjord and the French Empire protested, and protested
vigorously, against this arrest, giving as its reason that the West
Fjord served as a passage for navigation towards the north. 146 There
is no doubt about the truth of that factual statement and yet, as
has already been pointed out, despite the International Court of
Justice's earlier holding that a right of innocent passage existed
in territorial waters in straits connecting areas to the high seas,
it found, in the instant case, that Norway was entitled to close those
passages of straits, namely the West Fjord and the lndrelea. Hence
it is at least arguable that one might well say that, since the AngloNorwegian Fisheries Case is frequently cited as an authority, the
International Court of Justice's willingness to deny rights of innocent passage in or through any Norwegian historic bays, or through
any Norwegian historic waters, despite their previous use as
maritime highways, tends to throw doubt on the United Nations
Secretariat's position. The International Court of Justice has told
us quite conclusively that, despite its previous holding- of only a
couple of years before-in the Corfu Channel case, 147 that waters
through which third states claimed rights of innocent pass~ge such
as the West Fjord and the Indrelea could still be found t<>be internal waters (and thereby no longer subject to other state~s rights
of innocent passage) by reason of Norway's assertion, and proof,
of her historic title.
Indeed, the only way one can rationally reconcile the Corfu
Channel case with the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case is in terr11s
of the Court's finding of the status of Norway's historic bays and
waters to be internal waters, even though the two passages already
discussed, namely the Indrelea and the West Fjord, "connected two
146. Memorial of the United Kingdom (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. Pleadings (1 Fisheries
Case) annex 12, at 188 (Memorial dated Jan. 27, 1950); Norwegian Counter-Memorial (U.K.
v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. Pleadings (2 Fisheries Case) annex 15, at 53-55 (Counter-Memorial dated
July 31, 1950); Reply of the United Kingdom (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. Pleadings (2 Fisheries
Case) 330-32 (Reply dated Nov. 28, 1950); Rejoinder of the Kingdom of Norway (U.K. v. Nor.),
1951 I.C.J. Pleadings (3 Fisheries Case) 69 (Rejoinder dated Apr. 30, 1951).
147. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Judgment of Apr. 9).
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areas of the high seas" through which foreign shipping ordinarily
and necessarily transited. In the Corfu Channel case, we may recall,
it was the use of that channel as a passage connecting two high
seas areas (even although it was less than six miles wide) that
preserved the Royal Navy's right, and the rights of all other navies
and merchant ships, to navigate through it in terms of their rights
of innocent passage. While the Corfu Channel was territorial sea,
the Norwegian channels were internal waters by virtue of Norway's
consolidation of an historic title over them. In conclusion, then, the
United Nations Secretariat's proposition that the rights of
sovereignty or jurisdiction over historic waters or bays, which a
coastal state may claim are dependent on the competences or type
of sovereignty exercised, is questionable. In its regard we may find
reinforcement for the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case in the justly
famous decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in
the heyday of its functions as an imperial court deciding cases
between member states of the British Empire as well as between
their citizens, in the Direct U.S. Cable Co. v. Anglo-American Cable
Co.,1 48 where a title consolidated in terms of fishery regulation (which
in terms of the United Nations Secretaritat's thesis would merely
establish a competence over fisheries, or at most rights in the nature
of the territorial sea, leaving intact rights of innocent passage), was
seen as establishing a plenary competence including full sovereignty
and control over the laying of cables on the sea-bed, and the full
spectrum of activities lying between those discrete undertakings.
By contrast the critical comments which have been given in this
paper of the Untied Nations Secretariat's view are vindicated by
the excerpt from the judgment of the International Court of Justice
in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case quoted at the beginning of
this paper. This statement, moreover, accurately reflects customary
international law. 149
X. SOME CODIFICATION PROPOSALS
A. A VIEW FROM AFRICA

Despite the failure of the International Law Commission and
the 1958 and 1960 Law of the Sea Conferences to agree on a
generally acceptable definition of historic bays, some proposals have
been forthcoming both within and without the Third United Nations
148. Direct U.S. Cable Co., (1877) L.R. 2 App. Cas. 394 (P.C.).
149. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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Conference on the Law of the Sea. For example, the African States
Regional Seminar held in Yaounde on 20-30 June 1972 adopted, inter
alia, the following recommendations on "'Historic Bays' and
'Historic Rights':"
(1) That the "historic rights" acquired by certain neighboring African States in a part of the Sea which may fall within the
exclusive jurisdiction of another State should be recognized and
safeguarded.
(2) The impossibility of an African State to provide evidence
of an uninterrupted claim over a historic bay should not constitute
any obstacle to the recognition of the rights of that State over such
a bay. 150

The exception, in paragraph two above, of the practice in former
colonial areas pursued by the former colonial power refers to the
problem of how much credence should be given to the formulations
and policies arising from a former colonial occupation. A major
maritime colonial power may, in the pursuit of vindicating a policy
giving the freedom of the high seas the widest possible geographical
extent, have determinedly refrained from championing a subject
community's previously acquired, or possible inchoate, historic
rights in order to remain consistent in its global policy. Or, alternatively, it may have refrained from enforcing such historic rights
against third states in order to give a quid pro quo for the opening
up to the access of the world community by such third states of
their enclosed seas. Such a consistency of policy, the African ~,tates
Regional Seminar indicates, would have been bought at toe» high
a price and should not be permitted to continue to provide a ruling
principle in the post-colonial age.
Although this Seminar provides us with a very interesting
point of view regarding states' refusals to be bound by~' policies
stemming from the colonial era which they view as stultifyint their
national interests in coastal waters, it was disappointing because
it still left its member states' perceptions of historic bays undefined.
Perhaps the persistence of specific political rivalries in maritime
areas made agreement on an effective definition impossible.

150. Conclusions in the General Report of the African States Regional Seminar on the
Law of the Sea, held in Yaounde, from 20-30 June 1972, circulated as a Document of the
United Nations General Assembly Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and Ocean
Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction II, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/79 (mimeo. July
21, 1972).
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B. POLITICS IN THE THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON
THE LAW OF THE SEA: FORESTALLING A SOLUTION

During the course of the Third United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea the issue of historic bays was raised in the
Second Committee, mostly during the Second Session (at Caracas)
and delegates whose states had an interest in such bays or made
a special claim to historic waters (including Tonga's claim, propounded
on historic grounds, to a rectangle of the Pacific Ocean of
approximately 150,000 square miles) 151 spoke strongly on the
subject. 152 At the Third Session of the conference (in Geneva) an
informal consultative group on historic bays and historic waters
held two meetings. In addition, a smaller working party was formed
and held two meetings. 153 But it was not until the following year
that draft articles came before the Second Committee. That was
the document which Colombia submitted. It was as follows:
1. A bay shall be regarded as historic only if it satisfies all of
the following requirements:
(a) that the State or States which claim it to be such shall
have clearly stated that claim and shall be able to demonstrate
that they have had sole possession of the waters of that bay
continuously, peaceably and for a long time, by means of acts
of sovereignty or jurisdiction in the form of repeated and continuous official regulations on the passage of ships, fishing and
any other activities of the nationals or ships of other States;
(b) that such practice is expressly or tacitly accepted by
third States, particularly neighbouring States.
2. A bay the coasts of which belong to two or more States and
which satisfies the requirements laid down in paragraph 1 of this
article shall be regarded as historic only when there is agreement
between the coastal States to that effect.
3. The coastal State or States shall notify the International
Hydrographic Organization of the agreement or agreements
referred to in the foregoing paragraph and shall mark them on
151. See Statement of Mr. Tupou (Tonga), reprinted in II UNCLOS III OFFICIAL
RECORDS, supra note 17, at 107.
152. See Statement of Mr. Herrera Caceras (Honduras), id. at 101; Statement of Mr.
Abad Santos (Philippines), id. at 102; Statement of Mr. Galindo Pohl (El Salvador), id. at
104; Statement of Mr. Santiso Galvez (Guatemala), id. at 106; Statement of Mr. Herrera
Caceras (Honduras), id. at 108; Statement of Mr. Galindo Pohl (El Salvador), id.; Mr. Abad
Santos (Philippines), id. at 111.
153. See IV THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA OFFICIAL
RECORDS 196 (1975) [hereinafter cited as IV UNCLOS II OFFICIAL RECORDS (1975)).
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large-scale charts prepared by the States concerned. Until such
notification is supplied, the regime of. historic bay shall not apply
to the said bay.
4. No claim to historic bays shall include land, territory or waters
under the established sovereignty, sovereign rights or jurisdiction
of other States. 154

The student of the Conference's proceedings may well
anticipate a spirited debate of this perhaps unnecessarily restrictive formulation of the doctrine. But, having placed this draft on
record, Colombia appeared to be satisfied, for example, by the noninclusion of this topic in the list of "core issues" upon which the
Conference was determined to concentrate as expressed in its
"Organization of Work: Decisions taken by the Conference at its
90th Meeting on the Report of the General Committee." 155 Nor would
there appear to be any further debate, or at least significant debate,
on the record. Thus the Colombian draft article appears as the only
attempt, by the participating states at the Conference, to define
historic bays.
On the other hand, it should be remembered that Colombia has
actively opposed Venezuela's claim to exercise sovereignty over
almost the full extent of the Gulf of Venezuela (which leads to the
Lake of Maracaibo). Colombia's resistance to the Venezuelan claim
is due to the fact that a combination of historic title and the
Colombian-Venezuelan boundary on the western side of the bay
would give an extensive stretch of water (otherwise, in part, free
high seas) and its fishery, exclusively to Venezuela. 156 The rationale,
accordingly, of paragraph 2 of the Colombian proposal would appear
to have been drafted for the sole purpose of ensuring difficulty for
Venezuela in establishing her historic title to th~ bay and guaranteeing that Colombia's consent would have to be bargained for. A
similar rationale underlies the requirement of notification (in effect
registration?). This would provide Colombia with international
machinery whereby she could lodge a caveat _against any attempt,
on the part of Venezuela, to establish the Gulf as an historic bay.
154. Colombia, Draft Articles Concerning the Territorial Sea: Bays, the Coasts of Which
Bel,ong to a Single Stare, Historic Bays or Other Historic Waters, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.91
(1976), reprinted in v THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA OFFICIAL
RECORDS 202 (1976) [hereinafter cited as V UNCLOS III OFFICIAL RECORDS (1976)].
155. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/62 (1978), reprint,ed in VI THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE
ON THE LAW OF THE SEA OFFICIAL RECORDS 173 (1978) [hereinafter cited as VI UNCLOS III
0FFCIAL RECORDS (1978).
156. On the chronic discord between Colombia and Venezuela over the Gulf of Venezuela,
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On the other hand, paragraph 2's restrictive principle of only
permitting title to a historic bay to exist when (if two or more
coastal states are involved) they both, or all, agree would appear
to be in direct contradiction to the decision of the Central American
Court of Justice in the Gulf ofFonseca Case. 157 In that case the Central American Court of Justice found that the Gulf of Fonseca (Gulf
of Amapala or Conchagua) had been ·an historic bay jointly owned
by the three littoral states (Honduras, Nicaragua and El Salvador)
as successors of the Federal Republic of the Center of America and
of the Crown of Castile (which had exercised sovereignty over the
whole area of the bay from 1552 down to 1821 when the Federal
Republic replaced it) as res communis, despite Nicaragua's individual
attempt to part with, and dispose of, its share. 158
This disposition arose from the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty
whereby Nicaragua granted to the United States rights to dig and
operate an inter-oceanic canal from the Gulf to the Atlantic Ocean
and to establish a naval base in the Bay for a period of 99 years.
Protesting this agreement as a third party, El Salvador asserted
that such a concession derogated from her right of condominium
over the whole bay, while Nicaragua argued that only her separate
and individually owned portion of the Gulf was affected-and of
this she was entitled to dispose in full sovereignty .159 This separate
share of the Bay, moreover, was outside any zone of El Salvador's
interest, even though it was within the Gulf, because its historic
waters were not jointly owned by the littoral states under a condominium regime, but separately under regimes of individual ownership and sovereignty. Nicaragua also pointed to the fact that she
and El Salvador did not possess adjacent coasts (the coast of
Honduras on the Gulf separated them) so that there could be no
claim arising out of the adjacency of the proposed construction
works.
The judges of the Central American Court of Justice
unanimously found that the Gulf constituted a "closed sea" and that
it "belongs to three nations instead of one." It also found that
Nicaragua was not able to dispose of any rights in the Gulf as "a
thing possessed in common except jointly or with the consent of

see Nweihed, EZ (Uneasy) Delimitation in the Semi-enclosed Caribbean Sea: Recent Agreements
Between Venezuela and her Neighbors, 8 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 1, 9-10 (1980).
157. The Gulf of Fonseca, 11 AM. J. INT'L L. 674 (1917).
158. Id. at 693.
159. Id. at 694.
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all." 160 Had the Colombian draft article's paragraph 2 reflected the
international law of historic bays, Nicaragua's refusal to agree to
the inalienably joint ownership of the Bay, as reflected in her disposition of her separate share of the bay the provision, would have
been justified. The fact that Nicaragua's conduct was found to be
invalid on the ground of the Bay's special status as a jointly and
inalienably owned historic bay, points to the contradiction between
that decision and paragraph 2 of the Colombian draft.
Secondly, paragraph 2 of the Colombian draft is not clear
whether such a bay as it contemplates should be held by the littoral
states in common or separately when all agree thereto. Be that as
it may, paragraph 2 of the Colombian draft article, which contemplates historic title over a bay shared by two or more littoral
states as only being legally valid if both or all of the littoral states
(if there are more than two) have expressly agreed thereto, is contradicted by both state practice and public international law.
Indeed, the appraisal by Professors McDougal and Burke 161 of
the outcome, in terms of bays adjacent to two or more states, of
the 1930 League of Nations Codification Conference, and of the 1958
United Nations Law of the Sea Conference would seem to be equally
applicable to the Third (197 4-82) Conference. They wrote:
Unfortunately, all these [i.e. private or preparatory draft
codification drafts and replies on this topic of governments to the
Preparatory committee of the 1930 League Conference on the subject] indications of consensus are not reflected explicitly in the outcome of the 1930 Conference, in the International Law Commission or in the 1958 Conference. The 1930 Conference did not consider the question, the [International Law] Commission followed
suit and the 1958 Convention article on bays is limited to those
within a single state. Nevertheless all the prior indications of agreement among states, coupled with refusal of subsequent official
codification efforts to apply a provision similar to that evolved for
bays within a single state, provide strong support for the position
that the several states indented by a bay are not regarded as
authorized jointly to claim these areas as internal waters as a single
state could do in the same circumstances. 162

The authors did argue, however, that bays whose waters had
been the subject of historic assertions provided an exception to the
160. Id. at 728.
161. McDouGAL & BURKE. THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS (1962).
162. Id. at 442-43.
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rule of bays in general and they cited the Gulf of Fonseca Case as
authority 163 and pointed out that it also justified the "present-day
expectation that one of several states may not unilaterally decide
upon the use of waters over which the several possess authority
in common because of historic rights." 164
Both the Gulf of Fonseca and the Gulf of Aqaba, 165 came into
legal existence as enclosed seas when each of them was subjected
to the sovereignty of a single imperial state and survived as a res
communis (shared in community) amongst the plurality of successor
states or, perhaps, owned by one of the successor states, as in the
case of Palk's Bay and the Gulf of Manaar (these bays being under
the sovereignty of Sri Lanka alone rather than as the community
property of it and India 166). But, of course, these arms of the sea
had been subject, exclusively, to the sovereignty of the ancient kings
of the island since time immemorial. So, in a sense, the title of the
present Republic of Sri Lanka does not so much stem from being
a successor to the British Raj (and its predecessors, the Portugese
and Dutch colonial empires) as from the revival of that ancient
polity's earlier indigenous rights.
C.

THE PROPOSAL OF A DISTINGUISHED SCHOLAR

A third proposed definition, although brief, of historic bays at
least enjoys the impartiality and relevance to a wide variety of
phenomena which the Colombian draft appears to lack. That is
Strohl's proposed formulation which is as follows:
(b) A historic bay is an indentation whose waters are considered,
in whole or in part, to be internal waters. The indentation is one
having a genuine and long-standing economic link with the
surrounding coast. The historic bay contains waters over which
the coastal state or states have exercised a regime of internal
waters for a period of long standing, with explicit or implicit
recognition of such practice by foreign states. 167

This writer, however, does have reservations regarding the
above. While the need for a genuine link is acceptable, the validity
163. Id. at 443.
164. Id. at 445.
165. See Claim of October 2, 1957, by Saudi Arabia in the United Nations General
Assembly, 12 U.N. GAOR (697th plen. mtg) at 233, U.N. Doc. A/3575 (1957).
166. Fran~ois, Deuxieme Rapport Sur la Haute Mer, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/42, (1951) 2 Y.B.
INT'L L. 94-95.
167. M. STROHL. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF BAYS 404-05 (1963).
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of the definition's restriction to an economic (presumably including
resource-winning) limitation is questioned. Delaware Bay first came
under the exclusive and sovereign control of that young United
States from the need to vindicate her neutrality. It is suggested
that both Chesapeake and Delaware Bays testify to the fact that
national security interests may, equally with economic interests and
independently of them, provide the requisite "genuine link" with
the land territory to establish an historic bay. In addition to
economic and national security considerations, social, historical and
political factors may also provide the necessary intimate relationship between the sea area in question and the land.
Secondly, resort to the term "genuine link" without some further definition may arouse criticism. Some influential publicists, for
example, have objected to its extension from the Nottebohm Case 168
(in which its absence was used to disqualify grant of naturalization from entitlement to international recognition) to the definition
of the relationship of a state with a ship it permits to fly its flag
in Article 5(1) of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas 169 and Article
91(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. 110
Thirdly, the requirement, in light of the Fisheries Case, for
recognition is questionable. Surely if that case was correctly decided,
acquiescence is enough? 111

a

D. A STRATEGIC WITHDRAWAL?
Be these considerations as they may, many publicists and
diplomats today agree with what Mr. Sikri, the representative of
India at the First United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea, said in 1958, namely that:
[H]is county, which possessed two historic bays, was highly
interested in the problem raised by the Panamanian delegation.
He felt, however, that the Committee had neither the time nor the
material available to deal with the matter properly. Each bay having its own particular characteristics, a mass of data would have
to be sifted and collated before any general principles could be
established. 112
168. Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guat.) (Second Phase) 1955 l.C.J. 4 (Judgment
of Apr. 6).
169. Geneva Convention on the High Seas, done Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S.
No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 (effective Sept. 30, 1962) [hereinafter cited as Convention on the
High Seas].
170. 1982 Convention, supra note 13, art. 91(1).
171. See supra text of section III.
172. Statement of Mr. Sikri (India), reprinted in III UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON
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Things have not moved on, since 1958, from this concession
to the raw facts of geography, history and the local politics of a
region. Does this simply relegate the determination of whether a
bay is historic or not to the relative power of the claiming and the
negating state or states, or to their relative skills in negotiation?
Has the law to remain helpless in the face of this lacuna?
E. CODIFICATION OF HISTORIC RIGHTS: THE IMPOSSIBLE
DREAM?

The considerations may be concluded with two quotations from
the late Charles de Visscher. The first related to length of time
and publicity. He wrote:
[I]n the maritime domain, where some types of state activity
tending to create particular rights at the cost of the community
of states may at times go on without precise knowledge on the
part of interested governments or without placing them under any
legal obligation to communicate their view. Precise criteria can
hardly be formulated for judging the legal effect of abstention or
silence which may in some cases be due to a passing lack of
interest. 173

The second quotation from de Visscher's magisterial work
relates to the issue of legal precision and the possibility of general
definition. He pointed out:
This consolidation [by "Historic Titles"] which may have practical importance for territories not yet finally organized under a
state regime as well as certain stretches of sea, such as bays, is
not subject to the conditions specifically required in other modes
of acquiring territory. Proven long use, which is its foundation,
merely represents a complex of interests and relations which in
themselves have the effect of attaching a territory or an expanse
of sea to a given state. It is these relations, varying from one case
to another, and not the passage .of a fixed term, unknown in any
event to international law, that are taken into direct account by
the judge to decide in concreto on the existence or non-existence
of a consolidation by historic titles. 174

XI. SOME QUESTIONS

(1) With the development of new alternative concepts for the
purpose of coastal states' exercise of control over many of the
THE LAW OF THE SEA OFFICIAL RECORDS 74 (1958) ..
173. DE VISSCHER, supra note 108, at 208.

174. Id. at 209.
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activities which traditionally may have lacked adequate bases in
international law (other than extensions of the doctrine of historic
bays or historic waters, for example the Exclusive Economic Zone,
the Contiguous Zone, the Continental Shelf, the Air Defense
Identification Zone and the Doctrine of Archipelagos), has the doctrine of historic bays and historic waters become obsolete?
(2) What benefits does the doctrine confer on the international
community and/or coastal states which are not conferred by the
doctrines which extend coastal states' competences seawards and
which are recognized in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea?
(3) Are the provisions of Article 298 of the 1982 Convention
adequate for settling disputes with respect to historic bays or
historic waters?
(4) In any future codification of the legal doctrine of historic
waters including historic bays, should acceptance (as required in
paragraph l(b) of the Colombian Draft Articles 175 for the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea) provide the ruling
criterion, or should the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case 116 test of
acquiescence be enough to establish a littoral state's sovereignty
over an adjacent bay on historic grounds?
(5) Despite obvious differences between the doctrines enunciated, in the international arena, by the International Court of
Justice, for example in the Fisheries Case, with regard to the
substantive requirements for establishing rights to historic waters
and the procedural issues of burden of proof, and those prescribed
for the domestic scene within the United States by that Nation's
Supreme Court, do the more stringent requirements of the later
tribunal have a prospective utility as persuasive arguments for the
future evolution of international law on the subject?
(6) Are disputes with regard to the status of waters as historic
bays difficult to resolve when two or more states front onto a bay,
and only one or more (but not all) wish to characterize the waters
of the bay as historic (whether in terms of community property or
for their own individual claims of separate maritime areas)?
(7) Is it predictable that the evolution of the Exclusive
Economic Zone Doctrine, or the application of the Continental Shelf
Doctrine, will eventually facilitate or exacerbate a common
175. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 23-25.
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understanding amongst maritime nations as to the meaning, and
as to the rights thereunder, of historic bays? Or render them
obsolete?
(8) Does a general doctrine of historic bays in international
law have any future or should historic title be seen as arising under
unique circumstances so that historic bays can have no common legal
factors?
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